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TOWARDS A LASTING PEACE IN NEPAL: THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Nepal is in the grip of a constitutional crisis. The 
drafters of the 1990 Constitution hailed it as "the best 
constitution in the world", ending three decades of 
absolute monarchical rule by enshrining a multi-party 
system under a constitutional monarchy. But the nine-
year-old Maoist insurgency has cruelly exposed the 
inherent weaknesses in that settlement, and the royal 
coup of 1 February 2005 has dealt it a near fatal blow. 
Constitutional change is a necessary, if not sufficient, 
element for producing lasting peace. The conflict's root 
causes can only be addressed by structural change in 
the state and its governance system. Constitutional 
issues and the political means by which they are dealt 
with are crucial to a peace process.  
Unfortunately, there is no sign of agreement between 
the king, the political parties and the Maoists on key 
topics. Three areas need to be considered: 
? what substantive changes should be made to the 
constitution? Although the role of the monarchy 
lies at the centre of constitutional discussions, other 
important issues include democratic inclusion, sub-
national government, electoral reform and civil-
military relations; 
? what is the vehicle for political transition? There 
are various possible mainstream entities -- such as 
an all-party government -- that could eventually 
negotiate a transition but there are also Maoist 
and royal roadmaps; and 
? what is the process for modifying the constitution? 
Amendment of the current constitution by 
parliament or through referendum has been 
proposed but debate now centres on a constitutional 
assembly, a central Maoist demand which is now 
backed by mainstream parties and analysts. 
Constitutional issues are at the crux of Nepal's military, 
political and social crises. The Maoists have called for 
radical restructuring of the state, including establishment 
of a republic, since the start of their insurgency in 1996. 
The mainstream political parties opposed fundamental 
revision of the constitution until recently but are now 
willing to envisage greater change, although their policies 
are still a subject of debate. 
Even before the royal coup, the 1990 Constitution had 
been undermined by the May 2002 dissolution of 
parliament and King Gyanendra's repeated dismissals 
of prime ministers. Subsequent governments had little 
chance of conducting successful negotiations with the 
Maoists as long as real power rested with the palace. 
If the king hoped that his unambiguous seizure of full 
executive authority would bring the Maoist to talks, 
he was mistaken. 
The re-introduction of democratic institutions remains 
central to establishing a government that can negotiate 
with the Maoists and initiate a consensual process for 
constitutional change. But the palace is more concerned 
with consolidating royal rule, while a broader alliance of 
Kathmandu-centred interests has long opposed a more 
equitable distribution of power. 
Three vehicles for breaking the political deadlock in 
the capital remain: 
? an all-party government without a parliament: 
the royal coup has increased the previously slim 
likelihood that the mainstream political parties 
might manage to form such a government. But if 
it is constituted by royal fiat, it would lack the 
legitimacy and authority to negotiate effectively 
with the Maoists; 
? a government formed after new parliamentary 
elections: the Deuba government was tasked to 
hold parliamentary elections but this was never 
realistic. The king has announced municipal 
elections by April 2006 but there is no clear 
prospect of a general election; and 
? a government formed after restoration of the 
parliament elected in 1999: the king or the Supreme 
Court could restore parliament, although neither 
seems willing. This option was seen as a partisan 
measure that brings no guarantees of effective 
governance but it has now been endorsed by a 
coalition of mainstream parties. A parliament 
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restored with the limited mandate to negotiate 
with the Maoists on constitutional change might 
advance the peace process. 
A government negotiating with the Maoists would have 
three basic options for constitutional change: parliamentary 
amendment via Article 116 of the 1990 Constitution; a 
referendum; or a constitutional assembly. In Nepal, 
constitutional amendment is typically understood to 
preclude consideration of the role of the monarchy, while 
a constitutional assembly is equated with republicanism. 
In fact, either method allows flexibility. By contrast, a 
referendum on constitutional issues would likely 
destabilise the state, rather than identify an acceptable 
political compromise. 
Any viable tripartite process would need to allow the 
Maoists to argue to their cadres that republicanism was 
at least on the table and permit the king to feel confident 
the monarchy was sufficiently secure. A process in which 
key stakeholders have already reached critical informal 
agreements may be a way of delivering constitutional 
change peacefully, although it would have to be balanced 
with the need for transparency and accountability. 
Allowing for easy subsequent amendment would enable 
future adjustments. 
For the time being, however, the royal roadmap -- thinly 
disguised by the rhetoric of "protecting the 1990 
Constitution" -- appears to be one of systematically 
dismantling multi-party democracy while pursuing a purely 
military strategy against the Maoists. The options for 
democratically negotiated change are severely constricted. 
If the "constitutional forces" of monarchy and parties 
cannot form a common position, there may be no viable 
basis for negotiation with the Maoists. In this context, the 
Maoist roadmap of an interim government, ceasefire and 
freely elected constitutional assembly is likely to become 
the focus of increased attention. This would test Maoist 
sincerity but also that of the parties and the palace. Each 
side claims to speak for the Nepali people but none has 
shown much appetite for allowing the people to have a 
real say. Unless and until this happens, there is little 
chance of finding a lasting peace. 
Kathmandu/Brussels, 15 June 2005 
 
 
  
 
 
Asia Report N°99 15 June 2005 
TOWARDS A LASTING PEACE IN NEPAL: THE CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Nepal's civil conflict has three interlocking elements: the 
Maoist insurgency, a battle between the palace and the 
mainstream political parties over executive authority, and 
a challenge to the marginalisation of women, lower castes 
and ethnic groups.1 These elements mutually reinforce 
each other. The Maoists, for example, have highlighted 
and mobilised around longstanding ethnic and caste 
cleavages. Successive governments' failures to address 
the insurgency have played a role in undermining 
democratic institutions, allowing the king to seize more 
power. A solution for each aspect of the conflict must 
take into account the dynamics of the other two. 
Constitutional change of some kind may prove a partial 
solution to all three. The Maoists see constitutional 
transformation as essential. In contrast, King Gyanendra 
presents himself as guardian of the 1990 Constitution and 
resists most change. Nevertheless, in reforms suggested 
during the 2003 peace negotiations, a government 
selected by and representing the king proposed selective 
amendment as part of a settlement.2 The platforms of the 
mainstream political parties also acknowledge the need 
for constitutional change. Excluded ethnic minorities and 
castes see such change as central to achieving 
equality. However reluctantly, all the major players 
have acknowledged a role for some constitutional reform 
in the peace process. 
 
 
1 The conflict, which dates to the launch of the Maoists' 
"people's war" in February 1996, has claimed the lives of over 
11,000 people and led to widespread human rights abuses. 
Civilians have borne its brunt. See Crisis Group Asia Report 
N°50, Nepal Backgrounder: Ceasefire -- Soft Landing or 
Strategic Pause?, 10 April 2003; Crisis Group Asia Report 
N°57, Nepal: Obstacles to Peace, 17 June 2003; Crisis Group 
Asia Briefing N°28, Nepal: Back to the Gun, 22 October 
2003; Crisis Group Asia Report N°91, Nepal's Royal Coup: 
Making a Bad Situation Worse, 9 February 2005; Crisis Group 
Asia Briefing N°36, Nepal: Responding to the Royal Coup, 24 
February 2005; and Crisis Group Asia Report N°94, Nepal: 
Dealing with a Human Rights Crisis, 24 March 2005.  
2 See "Highlights of proposals of forward-looking reforms 
proposed by His Majesty's Government of Nepal", 17 August 
2003, p. 1. 
This report considers what that role might be. The 
substantive issues are increasingly well rehearsed, 
especially in the wake of the royal coup. They include the 
role of the monarchy and the distribution of executive 
powers, questions of democratic inclusiveness, sub-
national government and electoral reform, and civil-
military relations. An outline of some key topics and an 
indication of the contours of debate on them is given in 
section  IV. Questions relating to process -- how to carry 
out constitutional change and how to get to the point 
where it is possible -- have, however, generally received 
less detailed attention. There is a wide spectrum of 
options, from amendments by a parliament to a popularly-
elected assembly tasked with preparing a new founding 
document from scratch.3 Different modalities bring 
different conflict-related risks and would create varying 
levels of legitimacy for a changed or new constitution. 
Managed correctly, and with imagination, constitutional 
change could be an integral part of a sustainable 
negotiated peace. The varieties of strategies for managing 
change, therefore, are worth considering as possible 
subjects of and goals for peace negotiations. 
Two process-related problems must be addressed. First, 
the post-February 2005 environment has reduced the 
possibility of constructive negotiations. Even if direct 
talks were to take place between the king and the 
Maoists, they would be unlikely to lead to a durable 
settlement in the absence of participation by the 
mainstream political parties.4 A preliminary but vital 
step in any constitutional process is to move from the 
present political situation to one in which the political 
parties have a central place at the negotiating table. 
 
 
3 Except when the latter term appears in direct quotation, 
"constitutional assembly" is used in this report rather than 
"constituent assembly", a term also in circulation, to reflect 
the unambiguous reference to "constitution" in the Nepali 
term samvidhan sabha.  
4 The mainstream parties are primarily those that won 
parliamentary seats in the 1999 election: Nepali Congress 
(hereafter Congress), which has split, adding Congress 
(Democratic); Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist 
and Leninist, UML); Rashtriya Prajatantra Party (RPP); Nepal 
Sadbhavana Party (NSP); Nepal Workers and Peasants' Party 
(NWPP); and Samyukta Janamorcha Nepal (Janamorcha, also 
known as the People's Front Nepal). 
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Secondly, party, palace and insurgent positions are 
largely determined by calculation of the strategic 
advantages. No side is looking primarily to what is most 
likely to achieve peace. The risk of increased conflict 
associated with various modalities of constitutional 
change has yet to be considered by any side. 
This report analyses how constitutional change might be 
achieved given Nepal's legal and political framework 
after the king's twin power-grabs of 4 October 2002 and 1 
February 2005. It reviews the major options for breaking 
the Kathmandu political stalemate and achieving political 
transition (an all-party government, general elections, and 
restoration of the 1999 parliament) and outlines ways of 
achieving substantive constitutional change (including 
amendment under Article 116 of the 1990 Constitution, a 
referendum and a constitutional assembly). It also 
explores two alternative "roadmaps": the Maoist proposal 
for conflict resolution combined with constitutional 
reform, and the possible longer-term plans underlying the 
royal rhetoric of "protecting the 1990 Constitution". 
While this report limits itself to the formal process of 
constitutional change according to the interests and 
positions of the major political power centres in Nepal, 
two other significant factors not discussed in detail must 
be borne in mind. They are related, as both draw attention 
to the fact that the significance of constitutional change, 
and the reality of any constitution's operation, depend on 
dynamics more complex than those immediately 
suggested by a straightforward structural account. 
First, Nepal's emerging civil society has been active in 
helping frame and develop the debate on constitutional 
change.5 Academics, journalists and other commentators 
have generated considerable literature on constitutional 
issues and numerous conferences, workshops and 
seminars have been devoted to discussing them.6 The 
progress of such wider public debates and the ways in 
which they could feed into future negotiations is a topic 
worthy of separate consideration. Given the dynamics of 
 
 
5 "Civil society", a problematic term with many possible 
significations, is loosely used here in the basic sense of non-
governmental and non-political structures and networks such 
as academia, the media, NGO's, community associations and 
the like. 
6 There have been a multitude of initiatives, including the 
innovative Plusmedium online debate, which resulted in the 
publication of "Constitutional Dynamics of Impasse: Diagnosis 
and Dialogue", Integrated Organisation Systems, Kathmandu, 
2004. The increased use of web-based discussion has been a 
notable development in Nepali political debate, although 
patterns of access, participation (involving large numbers of 
non-resident Nepalis) and medium (overwhelmingly English) in 
themselves raise questions about the widening stratification of 
Nepali society. 
Nepal's conflict, it is unlikely civil society opinions will 
at this stage be decisive in shaping developments but it 
is important to work toward a negotiation process that 
will be more inclusive and provide opportunities for a 
range of voices to be heard. 
Secondly, the relationships between political and socio-
economic structures are crucial to the functioning of 
a constitutional settlement. Yet, these are never 
straightforward, particularly in a society as complex 
as Nepal's. Neighbouring India's experience since its 
independence in 1947 shows how the formal structures 
of a Westminster-style democracy have interacted with 
existing networks of social and economic power, regional 
interests, religious affiliations and traditional systems of 
government. This, too, is a major -- and largely unexplored 
-- area that deserves serious investigation. For example, 
the way in which the top-level structural reforms of 
1990 were simply laid over existing hierarchies, power 
configurations and patronage networks without necessarily 
displacing them is illustrative: Nepal's recent history 
underlines the dangers of assuming that formal legal and 
political arrangements will in themselves translate into 
fundamental transformations across society. The ability of 
existing hierarchies to replicate themselves under different 
guises, and the resistance of powerful elites to change, 
should not be underestimated. 
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 
A. THE RANA AND SHAH ERAS 
Nepal emerged as a nation-state when Prithvi Narayan 
Shah, king of the Gorkha area west of Kathmandu, 
expanded his dominion in 1768 by conquering the 
Kathmandu Valley. The Gorkha expansion ceased only 
in 1816, when Nepal clashed unsuccessfully with the 
British East India Company and was forced to accept a 
treaty that reduced its territory.7 Although in theory the 
monarchy retained absolute power, politics were 
dominated by conflicting factions within the royal family 
and a few elite families. Administrative power resided 
with a small group of royal officials, the Bharadars.8 
Even today, a small knot of noble families close to King 
Gyanendra play a disproportionate political role as 
unofficial royal advisers, bureaucrats or politicians.9 
This is only one way in which feudal structures have 
persisted since the advent of democracy. 
In 1846 a member of a noble family, Jang Bahadur 
Kunwar (who later adopted the title Rana), seized control 
through massacres of rival notables. For more than 100 
years, hereditary Rana prime ministers wielded absolute 
power, rendering the Shah monarchy mere puppets.10 
Jang Bahadur made the first effort to bring Nepal under 
a uniform judicial system in 1854 with the promulgation 
of the Muluki Ain, a nationwide legal code. In 1856 King 
Surendra signed an order transferring all political power 
to the Ranas.11 The Rana prime ministers maintained 
strict control of the military, keeping the title of Supreme 
Commander-in-Chief. Family members also monopolised 
the army's higher ranks.12 The Ranas were sustained in 
power primarily by the patronage of British India, which 
valued the uninterrupted supply of Gurkha recruits and 
only formally recognised Nepal's sovereignty in 1923. 
 
 
7 Bhuwan Lal Joshi and Leo E. Rose, Democratic Innovations 
in Nepal: A Case Study of Political Acculturation (Berkeley, 
1966), pp. 23-26; Joanna Pfaff-Czarnecka, "Vestiges and 
Visions: Cultural Change in the Process of Nation-Building in 
Nepal", in David N. Gellner, et al., Nationalism and Ethnicity 
in a Hindu Kingdom: The Politics of Culture in Contemporary 
Nepal (Amsterdam, 1997), p. 427. 
8 Joshi and Rose, op. cit., pp. 23-26. 
9 Crisis Group interview with former minister of law, 
September 2004. For a depiction of the palace secretariat 
and circles of influence around the monarch, see Jonathan 
Gregson, Massacre at the Palace (New York, 2002). 
10 Martin Hoftun, William Raeper and John Whelpton, People, 
Politics & Ideology (Kathmandu, 1999) pp. 2-3. 
11 Joshi and Rose, op. cit., p. 33.  
12 Crisis Group interview with Dhruba Kumar, Tribhuvan 
University, Kathmandu, 20 October 2004; Joshi and Rose, 
op. cit., p. 36.  
In January 1948 Rana Prime Minister Padma Shamsher 
proclaimed Nepal's first written constitution in an effort 
to accommodate pressure for a political opening while 
preserving the family's political monopoly.13 The 
constitution envisaged a council of ministers holding all 
executive power but controlled by the prime minister 
and a weak bicameral legislature exercising only limited 
jurisdiction.14 It made scant reference to the king and did 
not cite Hindu symbols as sources of the state's authority. 
It was never implemented because the Rana regime 
collapsed in 1950-1951, its end precipitated by 
independent India's unwillingness to support continued 
autocratic rule when its own princely states had been 
brought -- some forcibly -- within the ambit of a 
republican democracy. 
B. THE FIRST DEMOCRATIC INTERLUDE 
AND THE PANCHAYAT ERA 
In 1951 the Ranas finally ceded their absolute grip, 
agreeing to share government with the monarch, King 
Tribhuvan, and the Nepali Congress party, which 
had developed in India. Tribhuvan promised a "fully 
democratic political system functioning in accordance 
with a constitution prepared by a Constituent Assembly"15 
But the promised assembly never met. The second 
constitution was the transitional Interim Government Act 
of 1951, designed to last two years, but destined in fact to 
last eight. Promulgated by Tribhuvan, it divided power 
between the king and Council of Ministers, while reducing 
the prime minister's authority. With power to proclaim 
laws and veto legislation, the king gained substantially.16 
This arrangement, however, proved unstable when 
Tribhuvan declined to appoint a prime minister, repealed 
constitutional provisions concerning the cabinet and 
sought to rule directly with the aid of a royal council.17 
The third constitution suffered a similar fate. Reneging 
on his father's promise of a constitutional assembly, 
King Mahendra announced the formation of a palace-
appointed, constitution-drafting commission. It prepared 
a constitution, which was approved by the Council of 
Ministers, then promulgated by the king on 12 February 
1959, a week before the first parliamentary elections.18 It 
balanced monarchical power and democratic institutions 
 
 
13 Joshi and Rose, op. cit., pp. 63-64. 
14 The Government of Nepal Act, 1948, reprinted in Ram 
Kumar Dahal, Constitutional and Political Developments in 
Nepal (Kathmandu, 2001), p. 286.  
15 Joshi and Rose, op. cit., p. 91. 
16 The Interim Government of Nepal Act, 1951, reprinted in 
Dahal, op. cit., p. 306. 
17 Joshi and Rose, op. cit., pp. 103-107. 
18 Ibid, pp. 212-213, 282, 292. 
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uneasily, tilting heavily toward the former. It explicitly 
vested executive power in the king, allowing him, "acting 
in His discretion", to appoint the prime minister, dissolve 
the cabinet, summon parliament, and reject legislation.19 
The king, moreover, retained control of the army and 
had extensive emergency and residual power, including 
a vaguely worded "power to remove difficulties".20 Yet 
even this proved too restrictive for Mahendra, who in 
December 1960 had the Congress government, formed 
through the 1959 elections, arrested and assumed 
absolute political power.21 
Drawing inspiration from the "guided" democracies 
of Egypt, Pakistan and Indonesia, and from the Rana 
constitution of 1948, Mahendra's 1962 constitution 
instituted a four-tiered structure of "Panchayats" (councils), 
from the village and town, through the district and zonal to 
the national level.22 These were actually unrepresentative 
extensions of the palace. By barring political parties and 
vesting appointment for many Panchayat positions in the 
central government, the system concentrated political 
power while conveying a superficial impression of 
devolution.23 In addition, the 1962 Constitution established 
a series of "class organisations" for peasants, youth, 
women and other groups, which sought to co-opt or pre-
empt class-based social movements.24 Like the 1959 
document, the Panchayat constitution was promulgated 
by the king and vested in his hands all executive 
authority including the ability to issue ordinances and 
appoint the national Panchayat leaders, emergency 
powers, and control of the army.25 
 
 
19 Articles 10, 13(1), 17, 26 and 42 of the Constitution of 
Kingdom of Nepal, 1959, reprinted in Dahal, op. cit., p. 326. 
20 Articles 64 and 75-77 of the Constitution of Kingdom of 
Nepal, 1959, ibid, pp. 367-370. The provision concerning 
removal of difficulties is a precursor to Article 127 of the 1990 
Constitution, used by King Gyanendra to dismiss and appoint 
prime ministers of his choice since 4 October 2002. 
21 Hoftun, Raeper and Whelpton, op. cit., pp. 70-72; Joshi 
and Rose, op. cit., pp. 384-385. 
22 Although King Mahendra justified the Panchayat system on 
historical grounds, Panchayats were traditionally "instruments of 
caste administration…or judicial bodies in the implementation 
of Brahmanic social regulations", and largely ceased to function 
during the Rana regime. Ibid, p. 397; Articles 31-34 of the 
Constitution of Nepal, 1962, reprinted in Dahal, op. cit. p. 371.  
23 Richard Burghart, "The Political Culture of Panchayat 
Democracy", in Michael Hutt (ed.), Nepal in the Nineties: 
Versions of the past, visions of the future (Delhi, 1994), p. 
10; Joshi and Rose, op. cit., p. 400. 
24 Article 10A of the Constitution of Nepal, 1962, reprinted in 
Dahal, op. cit., pp. 379, 383-384; Hoftun, Raeper and Whelpton, 
op. cit., p. 76.  
25 Preamble and Articles 20, 39-40, 81A and 83 of the 
Constitution of Nepal, 1962, reprinted in Dahal, op. cit., pp. 
379, 383-384, 433-435. 
Unlike its predecessors, the 1962 Constitution manifested 
a distinct sectarian bias. Article 20 described the king as 
an "adherent of the Aryan culture and Hindu religion". 
Article 3 specified Nepal as a "Hindu" kingdom. Hindu 
symbols, like the cow as national animal, were embedded 
in the text and the provision that guaranteed religious 
freedoms consistent with "traditions" and barred conversion 
was understood as a way of protecting Hindu numbers.26 
These references to Hindu norms were designed partly as 
an effort to claw back legitimacy lost through abrogation 
of popular rule in December 1960 and partly to reinforce 
the historical conception of Nepal as the last refuge 
of Hindu purity, in contrast to oft-colonised and 
constitutionally secular India. 
C. THE 1990 CONSTITUTION 
The Panchayat regime collapsed in 1990 when confronted 
with a "people's movement" that organised street protests 
in the Kathmandu Valley and major towns. The people's 
movement was inspired in part by the Eastern European 
transitions to democracy and provoked in part by 
economic hardships caused by a March 1989 Indian trade 
embargo.27 Under pressure from the Nepali Congress 
party and the seven-party alliance of the United Left Front 
(ULF), King Birendra first eliminated the ban on political 
parties and then agreed to the dissolution of the national 
Panchayat and constitutional reform. He did not acquiesce 
easily to the latter but on recommendation of the Council 
of Ministers, he created a nine-member Constitution 
Recommendation Commission (CRC). Made up of 
lawyers affiliated with the parties and the palace, and 
led by a Supreme Court Justice, it prepared the draft 
constitution and presented it to the Council of Ministers. 
The CRC sought public opinion by visiting throughout 
the country but most feedback concerned religious, 
language and ethnic rights, topics that received only 
ambiguous endorsement in the final draft.28 The closed 
manner in which the 1990 Constitution was drafted was a 
significant factor in the calls for constitutional change that 
followed the Maoist insurgency.29 
 
 
26 Articles 6 and 14 of the Constitution of Nepal, 1962, ibid, 
pp. 379, 383-384. 
27 See Hoftun, Raeper and Whelpton, op. cit., pp. 115-186; 
Martin Hoftun, "The Dynamics and Chronology of the 1990 
Revolution", in Hutt, Nepal in the Nineties, op. cit., p. 14.  
28 Crisis Group interview with Nilamber Acharya, former law 
minister, Kathmandu, 28 September 2004; Hutt, "Drafting the 
1990 Constitution", op. cit., pp. 36-37.  
29 Some commentators and politicians still make a strong case 
against constitutional reform, arguing that the 1990 Constitution 
was effectively endorsed by the participation of people and 
parties in three general elections and constitutional bodies. The 
most sustained and detailed presentation of this point of view is 
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The CRC operated with a clear, limited mandate to design 
a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary system.30 
Throughout the drafting process, however, the king and 
his allies, including the army, exerted pressure to slow 
any shift toward democracy. Palace allies approached 
members of the CRC privately and introduced an 
alternative "palace draft" after the CRC had submitted 
its work to the Council of Ministers.31 According to a 
CRC member, senior army officers approached him 
directly and emphasised that the army should be under 
the king's control, and sovereignty should also reside 
with the monarch.32  
On 9 November 1990, Birendra, "with a strained face", 
announced the new constitution on television.33 On a 
majority of issues, the democratic political parties had 
resisted pressure to dilute the document's democratic 
credentials. An extensive set of fundamental rights that 
are relatively rare in other nations' constitutions, such as 
privacy, was included.34 There was also a bicameral 
legislature with a prime minister and cabinet selected on 
the basis of lower-house majorities. The monarchy was 
left mainly a symbolic role, with some residual authority 
over the line of succession and palace expenditures.35 
Ambiguity, however, remained about sovereignty and 
military control. Although the king remained nominal 
 
 
probably Mukunda Regmi, Samvaidhanik vikas ra nepal 
adhirajyako samvidhan 2047 (Kathmandu, 2005). Regmi also 
demonstrates that the palace was not the sole source of 
conservative influence in the constitution-making process: party 
representatives themselves rejected various progressive 
measures that had been in earlier drafts of the 1990 Constitution. 
30 Crisis Group interview with Biswanath Upadhyay, Chair of 
1990 Constitution Recommendation Commission and former 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Kathmandu, 29 September 
2004; Krishna Hachhethu, "Transition to Democracy in Nepal: 
Negotiations behind Constitution Making, 1990", Contributions 
to Nepalese Studies, vol. 21, no. 1, January 1994, p. 101. 
31 Crisis Group interviews with members of Constitution 
Recommendation Commission, Kathmandu, September 
and October 2004; Hachhethu, "Transition to Democracy 
in Nepal", op. cit., p. 102. 
32 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, September 2004; 
Michael Hutt, "Drafting the 1990 Constitution", in Hutt, Nepal 
in the Nineties, op. cit., p. 38. 
33 Hachhethu, "Transition to Democracy in Nepal", op. cit., 
p. 112. 
34 Crisis Group interview with lawyer, Kathmandu, October 
2004. Articles 11-23 of the 1990 Constitution of Nepal. 
Article 22 announces a right to privacy, which has yet to be 
invoked successfully in Nepali courts. 
35 Crisis Group interview with former legal adviser to King 
Birendra, 29 September 2004; see also Articles 27-33 of the 
1990 Constitution of Nepal. Crisis Group interview with 
Taranath Ranabhat, Speaker of the House of Representatives, 
6 October 2004.  
head of the army, operational control was transferred to 
the National Defence Council, which had a democratically 
elected majority.36 Nevertheless, the efforts of members 
of the CRC affiliated with the ULF to change the army's 
designation from "Royal" to "Nepalese" failed in the 
face of military intransigence.37 The constitution's 
allusion to sovereignty also captured the unresolved 
tension between popular will and royal prerogative.38 
The preamble, like those of 1959 and 1962, states that 
the king, not the people, promulgated the document. 
Nevertheless, Article 3 vests sovereignty in "the Nepalese 
people". Throughout the 1990s, the palace exploited this 
ambiguity to retain power in areas such as the appointment 
of ambassadors. Such efforts were only weakly and 
inconsistently resisted by the parties but the tension was 
only resolved eleven years later, when Gyanendra 
dismissed Prime Minister Deuba, instigating a series of 
palace-appointed governments with no democratic 
sanction. His seizure of absolute power in the royal coup 
of February 2005 confirmed the rupture of the always 
fragile contract between the palace and the democratic 
parties. 
 
 
36 Articles 118 and 119 of the 1990 Constitution of Nepal. 
These and other relevant Articles are reproduced in Appendix 
B. 
37 Crisis Group interview with member of CRC, Kathmandu, 
15 October 2004. 
38 Crisis Group interview with law professor, Lalitpur, 25 
October 2004. 
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III. THE STATUS OF THE 1990 
CONSTITUTION 
A. FROM DISSOLUTION TO DEUBA'S 
SECOND DISMISSAL 
No legislature has met since Prime Minister Sher Bahadur 
Deuba's decision in May 2002 to dissolve the House of 
Representatives, the lower house of parliament, pending 
fresh elections slated for November 2002. A prime minister 
may dissolve parliament only "pursuant to the provisions of 
[the] Constitution".39 The relevant constitutional provision 
explains that upon dissolving the House of Representatives 
on the prime minister's recommendation, the king 
"shall…specify a date, to be within six months, for new 
elections to the House of Representatives".40 Two 
members, Hari Nepal of the Nepali Congress party and 
Ganesh Pandit of the UML, appealed the dissolution to 
the Supreme Court. Relying on a 1995 precedent, that 
body upheld the dissolution.41 
In October 2002 Prime Minister Deuba, faced with a 
nationwide surge of Maoist violence, sought King 
Gyanendra's endorsement for a one-year postponement 
of elections. The king, describing the prime minister as 
"incompetent" because of his inability to hold the 
constitutionally-mandated elections, removed him on 
4 October and replaced him with Lokendra Bahadur 
Chand of the Rashtriya Prajatantra Party (RPP). Chand, 
the first of three palace-appointed prime ministers, was 
succeeded on 4 June 2003 by Surya Bahadur Thapa, 
another RPP politician, who lasted until 7 May 2004. 
Deuba was reinstalled on 2 June 2004 with a mandate to 
initiate general elections by April 2005. He slowly 
patched together a coalition government incorporating 
his Congress (Democratic), the UML, RPP, Nepal 
Sadbhavana Party and a royal representative. 
In appointing three prime ministers in succession, the 
king purportedly acted under the 1990 Constitution, 
Article 127 of which states that should "any difficulty 
aris[e] in connection with the implementation of [the] 
Constitution", the king shall have power to "issue 
necessary orders to remove such difficulty and such 
orders shall be laid before Parliament".42 It is only by 
virtue of Article 127 that prime ministers are appointed 
and lawmaking, by orders from the palace, continues. 
The constitution's continuing vitality thus hinged at this 
 
 
39 Article 45(3) of the 1990 Constitution of Nepal.  
40 Article 53(4) of the 1990 Constitution of Nepal. 
41 Crisis Group interview with Yubaraj Sangroula, Dean of 
Kathmandu School of Law, Kathmandu, and counsel for 
Hari Nepal and Ganesh Pandit, 21 October 2004. 
42 Article 127 of the 1990 Constitution of Nepal. 
stage on whether the king's interpretation and use of 
Article 127 was defensible. 
Due to the controversial manner of their appointment, 
Deuba and his cabinet lacked credibility. Other political 
actors, including the Maoists, viewed the coalition as the 
king's "puppet".43 Governing under the pervasive threat of 
Article 127 dismissal deprived the Deuba government of 
freedom to make independent policy choices. All 
decisions had to be approved by the palace.44 The 
government's fragility was acknowledged by donors, who 
nevertheless insisted that gambling on its survival was the 
best option in the wake of three failed administrations.45 
To maintain minimal international legitimacy and insulate 
the palace from responsibility for military and political 
settlements, the king sought to maintain a semblance of 
constitutionalism. This consideration initially appeared to 
foreclose the possibility of direct rule.46 
Opinions on the vitality of the 1990 Constitution varied 
from it being at "a dead end"47 to it remaining a "living" 
document with broad popular support,48 but its influence 
could be detected only faintly in the mechanics of the 
Deuba administration. The continuing vitality of the 
1990 constitutional dispensation was hanging by a 
thread that could hardly bear the heavy weight of King 
Gyanendra's three replacements of prime ministers. The 
consequent dearth of legitimacy was undermining the 
government's ability to negotiate or effect political 
change. The Deuba government had announced a 
deadline of 13 January 2005 for the Maoists to come to 
talks but there were no signs they would oblige, nor that 
the threat of going ahead with parliamentary elections 
without them could be carried out. 
Some kind of political transition was unavoidable. 
Information and Communications Minister Mohammed 
 
 
43 Crisis Group interview with political leaders, Kathmandu 
and Bhaktapur, October 2004. The Maoists declined to speak 
with the Deuba government, demanding instead to talk 
directly with its "masters". See Maoist press statement, 24 
September 2004. 
44 Crisis Group interview with senior Nepali journalist, October 
2004. A stark example of the Deuba government's ineffectiveness 
was given on 4 October 2004, when the High-Level Peace 
Committee sought public affirmation of palace support before 
offering to negotiate with the Maoists. "King grants audience to 
peace committee members", nepalnews.com, 4 October 2004.  
45 Crisis Group interviews with representatives of donor 
governments, Kathmandu, October 2004. 
46 Crisis Group interviews with Nepali lawyers and 
businessmen, Kathmandu, October 2004. 
47 Crisis Group interview with Sarita Giri, NSP, Kathmandu, 
26 October 2004. 
48 Crisis Group interview with Taranath Ranabhat, Speaker 
of the House of Representatives, 6 October 2004. 
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Mohsin, a royal nominee, had warned of an imminent 
authoritarian regime on 10 November 2004. Exactly a 
month later the Rajparishad (Royal Council), demanded 
a more active role for the monarch. Nevertheless, 
Nepal's most influential allies believed they had 
persuaded the king to strengthen the democratic centre 
rather than take precipitate unilateral action. 
B. THE ROYAL COUP OF FEBRUARY 2005 
On 1 February 2005 King Gyanendra used a royal 
proclamation to dismiss the Deuba government, impose 
a state of emergency and seize absolute power.49 The 
royal coup had openly acknowledged parallels with 
King Mahendra's dismissal of the elected government in 
December 1960. Gyanendra also imitated his father in 
following Pakistani precedents: while Mahendra had 
drawn on General Ayub Khan's example, Gyanendra 
tried to emulate General Pervez Musharraf. But the most 
notable parallels and continuities were not with any 
external example but with the indirect royal rule which 
had been instituted since October 2002. 
The coup was a dramatic -- and, at least initially, effective 
-- demonstration of royal will but it did little more than 
formalise the earlier assumption of de facto power and 
give more teeth to the state's repression of the political 
mainstream. A prescient Nepali writer had observed 
almost two months earlier, "By now everyone has heard 
rumours that King Gyanendra is going to take over. 
(Actually, the word on the streets is that he took over 
on 4 October 2002, and will soon quit pretending 
otherwise)".50 
As in his first dismissal of Deuba, the king sought to 
project an image of constitutional propriety by invoking 
his Article 127 powers to "remove difficulties". But his 
extensive use of that provision since October 2002 had 
already found little support in the constitution's text or 
expert legal opinion. The article is ambiguous, its 
scope not clearly delimited. This is perhaps deliberate: 
as a professor of Nepali law noted, its precise origins are 
"shrouded in mystery", although clues can be gained from 
its wording.51 The requirement for after-the-fact 
parliamentary ratification of the king's actions is key. This 
condition cannot be satisfied as long as the king appoints 
administrations rather than allowing a democratic 
parliament to meet, suggesting that the constitution's 
 
 
49 See Crisis Group Report, Making a Bad Situation Worse, op. 
cit. and Crisis Group Briefing, Responding to the Royal Coup, 
op. cit. 
50 Manjushree Thapa, "The word on the streets", Kathmandu 
Post, 10 December 2004. 
51 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, 25 October 2004. 
framers hardly had in mind the kind of crisis Nepal has 
faced since October 2002. The absence of a parliament, 
moreover, does not mean the king has general powers. 
The 1990 Constitution designates the Supreme Court as 
the body authorised to settle "any constitutional or legal 
question involved in any dispute of public interest or 
concern" through its "extraordinary power to issue 
necessary and appropriate orders to…settle the dispute".52 
CRC members agree Article 127 does not include the 
power to appoint and dismiss prime ministers after 
dissolution of an elected parliament and failure to hold 
elections. Still less does it entitle the monarch to 
dismantle the democratic structure envisaged by the 
constitution and rule without checks. According to the 
CRC chairman, retired Justice Biswanath Upadhyay, 
speaking before February 2005, "the king has 
misinterpreted Article 127", which was modelled on 
transitional elements in the Indian Constitution.53 "Article 
127 was supposed to be a weak saving clause", explained 
another member of the CRC. "In the case of an obstacle, a 
recommendation is needed from the prime minister, and 
[the measure] must be within the constitution".54 
Unsurprisingly, those close to the king disagree. They 
describe Article 127 as a broad grant of discretionary 
power, unique in the constitution's text. Any blame for 
constitutional breakdown, they argue, is due to Deuba's 
premature dissolution of parliament in May 2002.55 Their 
account, however, cannot explain Article 127's reference 
to parliament, or how the king's expansive use of it can be 
squared with the parliamentary edifice established in the 
1990 Constitution. The imposition of a state of emergency 
is similarly problematic: the king is indeed entitled by 
Article 115(1) to proclaim a state of emergency "if a 
grave crisis arises in regard to the sovereignty or integrity 
of the Kingdom of Nepal or the security of any part 
thereof, whether by war, external aggression, armed 
rebellion or extreme economic disarray". But such a 
 
 
52 Article 88 of the 1990 Constitution of Nepal; S.P.S. Dhungel 
et al., Commentary on the Nepalese Constitution (Kathmandu, 
1998), pp. 679-680. That commentary contends any order must 
be "no more than necessary to remove" a difficulty and cannot 
be incompatible with any other constitutional provision. Neither 
of these conditions is satisfied by the king's use of Article 127. 
53 Crisis Group interview with former Justice Biswanath 
Upadhyay, 29 September 2004. 
54 Crisis Group interview with Daman Nath Dhungana, CRC 
member, Kathmandu, 15 October 2004. Another CRC member 
has agreed in print. Bharat Mohan Adhikari, "Constitutional 
Assembly is not a panacea", in Mukti Rijal (ed.), Constitution & 
Its Application (1990-2004 A.D.) (Kathmandu, 2004), p. 24. A 
saving clause is an exception inserted into a constitution or 
statute to preserve a residual power the document otherwise 
eliminates. 
55 Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu, October 2004. 
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proclamation must be endorsed by a two-thirds majority 
of the House of Representatives within three months 
(115(2, 3)) or, if the lower house is dissolved, by the upper 
house (115(6)).56 The lifting of the state of emergency on 
30 April 2005 was welcomed as a possible first step 
towards re-establishing democratic norms but the question 
of whether constitutional rights are protected will still 
depend on the behaviour of the administration and security 
forces, and the willingness of the courts to hold them to 
account. 
In most respects, the 1990 Constitution now exists more 
as a rhetorical point of reference than as a functional 
template for governance. No elected or judicial official 
provides any check on executive excesses. Chief Justice 
Hari Prasad Sharma has argued that as the judiciary is 
incapable of judging the threat to national security, "it 
should have respectful deference to executive wisdom".57 
If the king's recent interview with Time magazine is an 
indication, current "executive wisdom" does not appear 
to have much respect for legal niceties: "No law abiding 
citizen in Nepal should feel any pain. Yet those who do 
not abide by the law, who do not accept the majority's 
choice, they will feel pain".58 
The constitutionally mandated Commission for the 
Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA)59 has been 
sidelined by a newly established Royal Commission on 
Corruption Control, which is being used to discredit 
political leaders. Its legal authority and constitutional 
legitimacy is dubious.60 But the Supreme Court refused 
to consider a writ challenging the Commission's legality, 
its registrar explaining that "no court has the authority to 
question any decision made by the King under Article 
31 of the Constitution".61 The chairman of the Nepal Bar 
Association has concluded that, given the Commission's 
 
 
56 The post-coup state of emergency also appeared to 
contravene international law, a subject beyond the scope of 
the present report. See Crisis Group Report, Dealing with a 
Human Rights Crisis, op. cit. and "Nepal: The Rule of Law 
Abandoned", International Commission of Jurists, 17 March 
2005. 
57 Speech delivered on 20 March 2005 at the 11th Conference 
of the Chief Justices of Asia Pacific. 
58 "It's a Question of Survival", interview with King Gyanendra, 
Time Asia, 25 April 2005, available at http://www.time.com/ 
time/asia/2005/nepal/int_ganendra.html. The king further 
clarified his views on the rule of law: "Perseverance, honesty 
and moral values must be part and parcel of our daily lives. 
A little law is required". 
59 The CIAA is established by Articles 97 and 98 of the 1990 
Constitution. 
60 "RCCC is an unconstitutional body: Koirala", nepalnews.com, 
20 April 2005. 
61 "Writ challenging royal commission rejected", 
www.kantipuronline.com, 4 May 2005. 
patent unconstitutionality, a legal challenge is futile: "It 
is completely a political battle, not a legal one".62 The 
balanced governance structures of the 1990 Constitution 
are effectively defunct. 
C. TOWARDS A "ROYAL ROADMAP"? 
In key respects, the king appears to have disregarded or 
discarded the 1990 Constitution in both letter and spirit. 
But as he relies on the argument that he has acted to 
preserve it, the rhetoric of protecting the constitution 
has, paradoxically, gained all the more significance. 
Defending the 1990 settlement also gives the impression 
of safeguarding the legacy of King Birendra, whose 
widespread popularity was only heightened by the 
palace massacre of 2001 in which he died. This public 
commitment thus allows Gyanendra to strengthen his 
position by linking his policies to the memory of his 
brother's achievements. The post-coup royalist position 
may, therefore, become all the more opposed to 
constitutional change in the short term. And quite apart 
from rhetorical legitimacy, the current constitution, with 
all its ambiguities, has served the palace well while 
guarding against the threat of open discussion about the 
monarchy. 
Nevertheless, there are many indications that the king's 
true goal is a return to Panchayat-style governance. 
Every positive reference to multi-party democracy in the 
1 February proclamation was qualified with an adjective 
such as "meaningful", "effective" or "successful".63 Talk 
of popular representation was conspicuously not linked 
to political party representation. Subsequently, the king 
has more explicitly indicated that parties are only an 
optional part of democracy: "Look, democracy is here to 
stay. No one will be able to get rid of it. And the institution 
of the monarchy will see to it that no one can get rid of 
it. But the parties are a vehicle in that progress, and you 
can always change vehicles. The people have to decide 
what vehicle they want".64 Further comments likewise 
hinted at a democratic system unmediated by parties: 
"We want to see mass participation in the democratic 
set-up, where the masses are given the opportunity to have 
a say in their own welfare. We want to see transparency, 
openness and communication flourish. The people must 
be their own masters".65 
 
 
62 "Legal debate on RCCC meaningless", Kathmandu Post, 
24 May 2005. 
63 Proclamation to the Nation from His Majesty King 
Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev, 1 February 2005. 
64 "It's a Question of Survival", interview with King Gyanendra, 
op. cit. 
65 Ibid. 
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Indeed, the king seems satisfied that the people can have 
their say in national affairs through him and that their 
representation -- through unspecified channels -- is 
already quite sufficient: "As far as being in touch with the 
people, do people's voices reach me? Are their aspirations 
being fully represented? I think we have developed the 
correct mechanisms and representatives to get that across 
to us. I am fully satisfied that I am hearing the voice of the 
people".66 The king has also offered insights into his 
"values and ideals". These are focused on economic 
development and make no mention of democracy: "Peace 
must reign. Then we can get on with the business of 
advancement of the system, of economics, of industries, 
of the wise use of our natural resources, and this will 
bring us to prosperity. I am also confident that all our 
friends will understand and support us in the pursuit of 
these values and ideals".67 As a senior envoy in 
Kathmandu concludes, "It's pretty clear that whatever the 
king means by 'democracy' is pretty different from what 
we would understand by the term".68 
Concrete actions taken by the royal government have 
reinforced suspicions that the administration derives its 
inspiration from the heyday of King Mahendra. For 
example, Education Minister Radha Krishna Mainali 
has announced the development of a new "nationalist" 
school curriculum. Nepal's textbooks have never been 
noted for lack of national sentiment but Mainali has 
reportedly engaged in a crash program to roll out the 
new curriculum in the higher secondary grades as soon 
as possible.69 On 11 April 2005 the king appointed 
five regional and fourteen zonal administrators,70 an 
unmistakeable, and no doubt deliberate, revival of 
Panchayat administrative structures. Under the Panchayat, 
the zonal commissioner (anchaladish) was a powerful 
and feared official who reported directly to the palace. 
The new system gives the administrator a different title 
(anchal prashashak) but embodies the same substance. 
In the words of a Nepali coalition of human rights bodies, 
"The state is systematically dismantling the structures of 
democratic polity and constitutional bodies".71 British 
Ambassador Keith Bloomfield adds: "Some of the people 
the king has surrounded himself with do not encourage us 
 
 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, May 2005. 
69 Crisis Group interview with journalists, Kathmandu, 26 
March 2005. 
70 "King appoints regional and zonal administrators", 
www.kantipuronline.com, 11 April 2005. 
71 "Human Rights Community Resists Authoritarian Regime", 
press statement of the National Coalition of Human Rights 
Defenders, Kathmandu, 5 June 2005. 
to believe him when he says he's interested in returning 
to democracy".72 
The composition of the royal "inner circle" also adds to 
the impression of Panchayat revival. As Kul Chandra 
Gautam has observed, "In plotting his coup, the King 
had reached out and enlisted the support from some of the 
old-guards from the Panchayat era of his father's absolute 
rule. Many of these old political cronies fill the King's 
cabinet and serve as his trusted advisers".73 This is not 
lost on the public, nor on the many Panchayat politicians 
who entered democratic politics and still nurse grudges 
against certain hardliners. "The King seems to have 
miscalculated the utility of these old loyalists' advice 
and support", says Gautam. "In one extreme case, a 
widely despised personality who had literally been 
chased out of the country during the heyday of the 
democratic people's movement in 1990 has resurfaced in 
Kathmandu in the King's inner circle of advisers".74 First 
Vice Chairman of the Council of Ministers Peter Giri has 
done little to reassure doubters with comments such as, "I 
don't believe in democracy; the king does".75 
Nevertheless, some features of an emerging royal roadmap, 
and longer-term options, are becoming discernible. First, 
the palace is determined to bring the security situation 
under some degree of control but may see advantages 
in continued instability. The intensified conflict across 
the country beyond the Kathmandu Valley has been 
accompanied by a cooling of rhetoric. In place of upbeat 
talk of a quick victory, the king is now preparing for a 
long haul: "It's not a question of winning or not winning. 
It's a question of taming".76 Conflict-induced disarray was 
in fact an asset to the palace as long as it could be blamed 
on ineffective political parties. That is no longer the case 
but continuing rural insecurity, perhaps further complicated 
by the activities of ethnic fronts and village militias, could 
be used to justify extending the period of tight autocratic 
control. 
Secondly, some sort of elections will be necessary to 
provide continuing legitimacy for royal rule. Initially, the 
call for municipal polls serves three purposes: (i) it puts 
pressure on the political parties to decide on a response 
and ensure there is a solid common position; (ii) it offers 
the international community a way of normalising the 
situation and reducing pressure on the king; and (iii) it 
 
 
72 Interview with British Ambassador Keith Bloomfield, 
Nepali Times, 18 March 2005. 
73 Kul Chandra Gautam, "Mistakes, Miscalculations & Middle 
Ground", www.blog.com.np, 4 April 2005. 
74 Ibid. 
75 Quoted by Narayan Wagle, Kantipur, 8 April 2005 and 
translated in Nepali Times, 15 April 2005. 
76 "It's a Question of Survival", interview with King Gyanendra, 
Time Asia, op. cit. 
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may help to attract the support of royalist politicians who 
have so far been conspicuously unenthusiastic about the 
royal takeover. 
The government is pressuring the parties to participate and 
insisting the polls will be free and fair. "The government 
expects cooperation and participation of the political 
parties in the elections", stated Minister Tanka Dhakal. 
"We request all the political parties to stay prepared for 
the elections".77 Local elections and "decentralisation" 
plans offer the king a veneer of democratic respectability. 
This was the route adopted by Mahendra and has been the 
tried and tested method of successive Pakistani military 
dictators, including Musharraf.78 The calculation that the 
call for local polls will split the diplomatic community is 
already proving justified: U.S. and British diplomats have 
been urging the parties to view this as a positive step 
towards incremental re-establishment of democracy and 
take part. Other diplomats are more sceptical and share 
the parties' initial response that the call for elections is 
merely a cynical subterfuge.79 Some who have to support 
the election call in public are scathing in private: "The 
parties insist this is a ploy by the king, and they certainly 
seem to be justified in that", a senior diplomat said.80 A 
widening rift in the international response to the royal 
coup is likely. 
Finally, the elections call may be the best way for the king 
to expand his support among royalist politicians. Most big 
names from the Panchayat period and the royalist RPP 
have maintained silence or ambivalence on the 1 
February takeover.81 There is palpable doubt among 
even the staunchest palace supporters that the king's 
strategy is viable and worth investing in. Many hardline 
Panchayat leaders opted for a quiet retirement after 1990 
and will think hard before committing themselves to 
public involvement in the new royalist administration. 
Moreover, Panchayat politicians who entered the multi-
party system have become accustomed to, and adept at, 
 
 
77 "Govt. pledges free and fair municipal polls", nepalnews.com, 
21 April 2005. 
78 See Crisis Group Asia Report N°40, Pakistan: Transition to 
Democracy?, 3 October 2002 and Crisis Group Asia Report 
N°77, Devolution in Pakistan: Reform or Regression?, 22 
March 2004. 
79 Crisis Group interviews with Kathmandu-based diplomats, 
journalists and political activists, April 2005. 
80 Crisis group interview, Kathmandu, May 2005. 
81 For example, RPP Chairman Pashupati Shamsher Rana's 
response to the events of 1 February is that "the alternative 
was to change the Prime Minister or to try another multi-
party coalition….The constitution visualises an emergency 
under multi-party norms, not without those norms. It has 
changed all equations. If a compromise is not brought about, 
the consequences are inconceivable", in "Was February 1 
necessary?", www.liberaldemocracynepal.org, 12 May 2005. 
working within the democratic set-up. They have 
developed grass-roots links, and many are unconvinced 
that the palace strategy will displace now established 
habits of party representation and loyalty.  
As a party-less and palace-centred system, Panchayat 
politics revolved around personal intrigue and rivalries. 
For all the king's justified complaints about petty party 
bickering, the royalist RPP has been the most consistently 
fractious democratic party. While its leader refuses to back 
the royal coup, other prominent activists are urging 
support and threatening yet another split if their views go 
unheeded.82 There is also pressure from activists who are 
tempted by the prospect of appointment to influential 
positions on local bodies. There is bad blood between 
senior royalists, with grudges dating back decades. This is 
partly responsible for the sidelining of the more competent 
and experienced monarchists. A ministerial reshuffle 
combined with the temptation of polls and elected office 
may go some way towards consolidating the palace's 
political base by encouraging supportive politicians to 
take a more active role. 
If the king is successful in building a solid base for 
palace rule, questions of constitutional reform along 
royalist lines will slowly but surely find their way onto a 
more public agenda.83 In late 2004 senior mainstream 
politicians believed the king had probably already 
drafted a new constitution to spring on the country 
but this seems an unlikely option.84 The temptation to 
institutionalise a more active role for the monarch 
may grow but any proposed reforms are likely to be 
articulated by sympathetic politicians rather than attributed 
directly to the palace. Royal plans for constitutional 
change might include three distinct models or, more 
likely, a combination of approaches: 
? parliamentary elections leading to amendment: 
if municipal polls are held, the logical next step 
would be some form of general election which, 
with or without mainstream party participation, 
might return a largely royalist legislature. The 
Article 116 route for amendment could then be 
pursued and the 1990 settlement could be modified 
in a fashion that reinforced royal commitment 
to constitutional norms; 
? a constitutional commission: if there is no progress 
towards national elections, the establishment of a 
special commission is a possibility. Its membership 
 
 
82 "RPP dissident faction warns of schism in party", 
www.kantipuronline.com, 5 June 2005. 
83 The possible options outlined here are drawn from numerous 
Crisis Group interviews with royalists, other politicians, 
journalists and analysts in Kathmandu, February to April 2005. 
84 Crisis Group interviews, 13-15 December 2004. 
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could be carefully selected to represent a range of 
interests while remaining vulnerable to concerted 
palace and military pressure; and 
? a referendum: palace sources are already talking of 
a referendum as a possibility. The power to define 
its terms would give the palace a strong hand. If 
the electorate's options were reduced to choosing 
between "terrorism" or "democracy under an 
active monarch", the king might secure some form 
of mandate for amending the constitution to reflect 
a more active approach. 
These remain for now hypothetical options. As a senior 
journalist commented on palace thinking, "it's a khichadi 
model",85 a reference to a rice and lentil hotch-potch that 
perhaps most accurately describes the royal strategy 
to date. The palace has yet to give a convincing picture 
of its agenda, and the public statements of the king 
and his ministers leave an impression of some 
confusion. The palace may develop a roadmap that 
goes beyond consolidating royal power to addressing 
more of the fundamental issues outlined below. But if 
such a roadmap is gradually elaborated, it will be 
subject to the same questions of process, inclusion, 
legitimacy and durability that apply to all other models. 
It is doubtful that either continued palace rule under the 
current circumstances or selective, royally-sponsored 
amendments to the constitution will provide answers to 
Nepal's deep, underlying problem. 
D. THE NEED FOR A DEMOCRATIC WAY 
OUT 
On the Maoist side, willingness to re-enter democratic 
politics will hinge in part on the perceived costs and 
benefits.86 A government subject to royal fiat with a fig-
leaf of constitutional legitimacy is not attractive to a far-
left party like the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist)87 
but anecdotal and polling data suggest the Maoists 
would command a respectable vote in a democratic 
election.88 Because support for Maoist goals apparently 
 
 
85 Crisis Group interview, 20 April 2005. 
86 Crisis Group interview with international conflict specialist, 
Kathmandu, 25 October 2004. 
87 The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) is abbreviated to 
CPN(M). The Maoist movement consists of the party, the 
"people's liberation army" and the "united front". For the 
purposes of this report, however, "the CPN(M)" and "the 
Maoists" may be understood as loose equivalents. 
88 One analyst of July 2004 polling data suggested that the 
CPN(M) would obtain at least 8 per cent of the vote. Crisis 
Group interview, Kathmandu, October 2004. Another detailed 
field survey of the Maoist movement predicted that it might win 
about 15 per cent. Robert Gersony, "Sowing the Wind: History 
exceeds support for their violent methods, they could 
benefit if they were to re-enter democratic politics and 
renounce the use of violence.89 Yet this depends on the 
existence of democratic politics. If governments and 
cabinets remain at the king's pleasure, limited CPN(M) 
options will be dependent on the king's goodwill. In 
short, without a restoration of the democratic process, 
the Maoists have little reason to negotiate, unless to 
weaken the mainstream parties further by reaching a 
temporary deal with the palace. 
The king and the Maoists cannot negotiate a stable 
solution without the parties' involvement. The latter, 
notwithstanding the involvement of a handful in the 
Deuba administration, have been systematically 
marginalised since October 2002 and directly repressed 
since February 2005. Nevertheless, they retain considerable 
support across the country. Recent polling demonstrates 
that, despite a certain scepticism, about one third of 
Nepalis retain affiliations with them.90 Any attempt by 
the Maoists and the king to lock the mainstream parties 
permanently out of power would lead to growing 
instability. Moreover, a solution reached by negotiation 
between Nepal's two non-democratic power centres 
would be unlikely to reflect the interests of most of the 
population. 
The country's long-term interests are also most likely to 
be served by a return to democratic politics. Despite 
their flaws, it is the political parties who can best 
mediate popular interests, not the unelected monarchy or 
Maoists. Although the parties now tend to be 
unrepresentative of Nepal's diversity, they are the best 
hope for incorporating that diversity into democratic 
politics. Recent polls indicate that around 60 per cent of 
Nepalis still consider democracy under a constitutional 
monarchy the best form of government.91 
 
 
and Dynamics of the Maoist Revolt in Nepal's Rapti Hills", 
Report submitted to Mercy Corps International, October 2003, 
p. 79, available at http://www.mercycorps.org/items/1662/. 
89 Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research Inc., "Faith in 
Democracy Endures, in Spite of Disappointments: Report 
on the Baseline Survey and Focus Groups", Washington, 
16 August 2004, p. 8. 
90 A recent nationwide survey concluded that more than 28 per 
cent were not afraid to say they were close to a mainstream 
party, in spite of Maoist violence and intimidation. Crisis 
Group interview with Krishna Hachhethu, Kathmandu, 4 
October 2004. Another found 41 per cent willing to affiliate 
with a mainstream party. Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research 
Inc., op. cit., p. 10. The methodology of this poll has not been 
published. 
91 A July 2004 nationwide poll found that 60 per cent of 
respondents favour a democracy with a constitutional 
monarchy, 17 per cent democracy without a monarchy; 9 per 
cent a return to the Panchayat system, and 2 per cent an 
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IV. SUBSTANTIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
ISSUES 
Any structured debate on constitutional reform will have 
to encompass a multitude of substantive issues, on each 
of which a wide range of positions exists, some more 
easily reconciled than others. The following sections 
outline a few of the central topics, and the arguments 
and policy positions that will shape the debate. 
A. THE MONARCHY 
The 1990 Constitution attempts to create a constitutional 
monarchy without substantive political power. The king 
is part of both the executive and the legislature92 but 
his roles are formally constrained. Except in limited 
circumstances, he is to act only "upon the recommendation 
and advice, and with the consent of the Council of 
Ministers", as submitted through the prime minister.93 
The king is to appoint an individual with a parliamentary 
majority as prime minister, although there seems to 
be some discretion when more than one coalition is 
conceivable. He must assent to new legislation, and on 
the prime minister's recommendation, he also nominates 
one-sixth of the National Assembly (upper house), and 
appoints the army's commander-in-chief.94 
By contrast, "there must be a reference to an exclusive 
power [in the constitution] for the king to have a 
privilege".95 Under this interpretation, the king retains 
independent authority in matters of royal succession and 
royal expenditure.96 Article 127, discussed above, was 
further included to allow the king to smooth disruptions 
in the democratic system. The king can also issue 
ordinances with "the same force and effect as an Act" 
when parliament is not in session.97 Moreover, the 
palace is sheltered from criticism by broad judicial 
 
 
absolute monarchy. Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research 
Inc., op. cit., p. 6. A separate survey conducted in November 
and December 2004 found 53.4 per cent in favour of a 
"fully constitutional monarchy" with 5.5 per cent in favour 
of an absolute monarchy and 4.9 per cent of a republic, "Nepal: 
Contemporary Situation", Sudhindra Sharma and Pawan 
Kumar Sen, The Asia Foundation/Interdisciplinary Analysts, 
Kathmandu, 2005, p. 30. 
92 Articles 35(1) and 44 of the 1990 Constitution of Nepal. 
93 Article 35(2) of the 1990 Constitution of Nepal.  
94 Articles 36, 4, 46(1), 69 and 119(1) of the 1990 Constitution 
of Nepal.  
95 Crisis Group interview with Nilamber Acharya, former 
Law Minister, Kathmandu, 28 September 2004.  
96 Articles 28 and 29 of the 1990 Constitution of Nepal.  
97 Article 72 of the 1990 Constitution of Nepal. 
immunity and a restriction on discussion of the royal 
family in parliament.98 
Both Birendra and Gyanendra have leveraged these 
limited constitutional opportunities with an informal, 
extra-legal support base in the army and traditionally 
powerful families. Eliminating constitutionally-granted 
royal prerogatives could not in itself establish a functioning 
constitutional monarchy. Legal change alone will not erase 
the familial connections and ties of caste and patronage 
which shape the distribution of power in Nepal, as the 
experience of the 1990 CRC suggests. A transition to a 
genuine constitutional monarchy would require more 
fundamental change but Nepal's history suggests such a 
shift will prove difficult.99 
In light of these obstacles, and in particular following the 
king's power-grabs in October 2002 and February 2005, it 
is unsurprising that some are sceptical of the possibilities 
of retaining both a monarchy and a democracy.100 Nepal 
has twice obtained a democratic constitution with 
the king's active involvement in the drafting. On both 
occasions, the palace was instrumental in undermining 
democratic mechanisms and restoring royal authority.101 
The Maoists' republican stance had until 2002 been a 
clear point of difference with the mainstream parties, 
which have traditionally supported a constitutional 
monarchy. But growing calls for a revision of this policy -- 
most vocally from republican students within the Congress 
and UML -- have been bolstered by more cautious party 
leaders' suspicions of the king's intentions. 
"The door for unity and national reconciliation has been 
blocked now", says Girija Prasad Koirala. "The future of 
[the] monarchy is at stake after ending the consensus of 
[the] 1990 people's movement". Madhav Nepal has 
similarly warned that "if the king doesn't need political 
parties and their leaders, we will also review our policy 
[towards the monarchy]".102 Reference to constitutional 
monarchy is conspicuously absent from post-February 
2005 mainstream political rhetoric. Instead, even 
moderate political leaders are now demanding that 
the king choose between complete democracy or 
republicanism. 
 
 
98 Articles 31 and 56 of the 1990 Constitution of Nepal. 
99 Crisis Group interview, Kirtipur, October 2004. 
100 Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu, Lalitpur and Kirtipur, 
October 2004. 
101 In a poll of Kathmandu Valley residents, almost half said 
the king was in charge of the nation. Hari Sharma, "What 
Kathmandu Valley thinks", Nepali Times, 15-21 October 
2004, p. 4. 
102 "Policy towards monarchy may be reviewed: leaders", 
nepalnews.com, 5 May 2005. 
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Moreover, the institution of a monarchy generates potential 
governance problems, especially for an ethnically 
fragmented society. It operates in some ways like the 
presidential system, which has been criticised as a model 
for young democracies.103 The palace is an alternative, 
destabilising power centre claiming to "represent the 
nation", notwithstanding the democratic pedigree of the 
parliament.104 By providing an avenue for appeal for 
unsuccessful factions and minorities, it competes with 
parliament. No system has been identified yet to resolve 
that instability. Moreover, the monarchy is not an 
institution that naturally represents a variety of ethnic 
groups, despite the self-serving rhetoric of palace allies. 
To the contrary, monarchical rule is associated with 
the continuing control of a narrow elite that has been 
entrenched historically. Even with broader representation 
of ethnic minorities in democratic institutions, it may 
give deeply resented advantage to traditional ethnic 
elites. 
An argument frequently made in favour of the continuation 
of the monarchy in Nepal is that it provides an element 
of stability in a country which lacks the institutional 
ballast of a mature parliamentary system, judiciary and 
bureaucracy. But this depends on the monarch refraining 
from destabilising actions and remaining aloof from 
day-to-day politics. The widespread sense that the king 
himself has become a serious source of instability is one 
reason for the strong international response to the royal 
coup. As a prominent Indian security analyst observes, 
"the reason for New Delhi's sustained pressure on the 
king is that almost everyone now sees him as part of the 
problem rather than part of the solution".105 
Meanwhile the stability of the monarchy itself is dependent 
on a smooth transition between kings, a condition that the 
June 2001 royal massacre and its aftermath have shown 
to be far from guaranteed. The nature of a hereditary 
kingship is such that it leaves the country to be ruled by 
heirs whose political leanings and capacities may vary 
greatly.  
A constitution that limits royal power appears to be the 
goal of most Nepali citizens,106 but the exigencies of the 
political crisis caused by the insurgency may hinder 
development of a stable constitutional monarchy that can 
co-exist with democracy. To break the political deadlock 
 
 
103 A classic critique is Juan J. Linz, "The Perils of 
Presidentialism", in Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner 
(eds.), The Global Resurgence of Democracy (Baltimore, 
1993), p. 108. 
104 Crisis Group interview with former Panchayat politician, 
7 October 2004. 
105 Crisis Group interview, New Delhi, 6 May 2005. 
106 See polling data in fn. 91 above. 
and move forward in the peace process, the king should 
ideally be on board. But he is unlikely to accept any 
transitional process that risks diluting his power 
significantly, as would be necessary for long-term 
democratic stability. The short-term imperative of a 
transition to a more democratic government in order to 
give life to the moribund peace process may, therefore, 
limit opportunities for long-term reform of the monarchy. 
This could be addressed by providing a revised or new 
constitutional document with a broad amendment clause 
that would facilitate periodic re-adjustments to the 
balance of power. If even this proves too much for the 
palace to accept, the efforts already underway to broker 
peace between the parties and the Maoists regardless of 
the king's position will probably gain more momentum. 
B. SOCIAL AND POLITICAL EXCLUSION OF 
ETHNIC AND CASTE GROUPS 
Though Nepal's population of approximately 23 
million encompasses a tremendous ethnic, linguistic 
and religious diversity, administrative and political 
power has been held by a small fraction, principally 
Brahmans, Chhetris and Newars.107 Dalits -- those at 
the very bottom of the caste system -- face particular 
cultural and social stigmatisation, often even a bar to 
education and basic resources like water from public 
taps and public accommodations.108 
The constitution contains scant recognition of Nepal's 
diversity or its history of ethnic, caste and gender 
inequity.109 Both the chairman of the CRC, Biswanath 
Upadhyay, and its most prominent communist member, 
Nirmal Lama, opposed special provisions for ethnic 
groups, citing fears of communalism and invoking a desire 
for "national unity".110 Although Nepal is described as 
a "multiethnic" and "multilingual" kingdom, the term 
"multireligious" is absent. Rather, the monarchy is 
 
 
107 Crisis Group interviews with ethnic leaders, Kathmandu and 
Lalitpur, October 2004. In 1999, the elite high-caste Hindu groups 
of Brahmans and Chhetris held 66.6 per cent of "higher positions 
of politics, judiciary, bureaucracy, and civil society". Newars 
had 13.2 per cent and dalits none. Harka Gurung, "Affirmative 
Action in Nepalese Context", p. 3, unpublished paper delivered 
at conference on affirmative action and electoral reform, 
Kathmandu. A comprehensive description of Nepal's exclusive 
polity and prescription for inclusive political institutions is 
presented in Mahendra Lawoti, Towards a Democratic Nepal 
(Kathmandu/New Delhi, 2005). 
108 Crisis Group interviews with international donor agency 
staff and dalit activists, October 2004. 
109 Crisis Group interviews with ethnic activists, Kathmandu, 
September, October 2004. 
110 S.P.S. Dhungel et al., Commentary on the Nepalese 
Constitution (Kathmandu, 1998), p. 39. 
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"Hindu" by definition.111 Nepali is the "official" language, 
with other indigenous tongues designated only as 
"national" languages.112 Citizenship by naturalisation is 
contingent on learning Nepali.113 
The 1990 Constitution disfavours assertions of ethnic 
identity. Despite guaranteeing the freedom to organise 
political parties, it does not allow the registration of 
parties organised "on the basis of religion, caste, tribe, 
language or sex".114 However, the restriction on ethnic 
parties has been applied inconsistently. In 1991, the 
Mongol National Organisation was barred from the 
polls, but the Nepal Rashtriya Jan Mukti Morcha, 
which represented hill ethnic groups, and the Tarai 
regionalist Nepal Sadbhavana Party (NSP) were 
allowed to register and contest the election.115 In 1999, 
the Election Commission allowed Shiv Sena Nepal, a 
party with clear Hindu sectarian affiliations, to register 
and contest the election.116 
The constitution's equality provision permits, but does not 
guarantee, compensatory measures for "economically, 
socially or educationally backward" classes.117 Post-1990 
governments have mostly failed to address minorities' 
grievances, despite campaigns by a multitude of new 
pressure groups. Government action has involved a token 
reservation policy118 and creation of commissions, like the 
National Foundation for the Development of Indigenous 
Nationalities and the National Dalit Commission.119 The 
Supreme Court ruled efforts to allow the administrative 
use of languages other than Nepali illegal and invalidated 
attempts to loosen the criteria for citizenship.120  
 
 
111 Article 4 of the 1990 Constitution of Nepal. The national 
colour, anthem and symbol all reflect Hindu symbolism. 
Article 7 of the 1990 Constitution of Nepal. 
112 Article 7 of the 1990 Constitution of Nepal. 
113 Article 9(4)(a) of the 1990 Constitution of Nepal. 
114 Article 113(3) of the 1990 Constitution of Nepal. 
115 John Whelpton, "The General Elections of May 1991", in 
Hutt, Nepal in the Nineties, op. cit., p. 50.  
116 Crisis Group interview with local government specialist, 
Lalitpur, 13 October 2003. Shiv Sena obtained 0.02 per cent of 
votes and no seats. "The Fourth Parliamentary Election: A 
Study of the Evolving Democratic Process in Nepal", Institute 
for Integrated Development Studies (Kathmandu, 2000), p. 45.  
117 Article 11(3) of the 1990 Constitution of Nepal. 
118 See fn. 203 for a brief definition of "reservation" in this 
context. 
119 Both commissions were formed in 2002. Sujeet Karn, "Nepali 
dalits and reservation", The Kathmandu Post, 11 August 2004. 
120 It reasoned that Article 9 of the constitution provides 
immutable and exclusive citizenship criteria. Crisis Group 
interview with political analyst, Kathmandu, 30 September 
2004; Balkrishna Neupane v. His Majesty's Government, 
Cabinet Secretariat and others, reprinted in Ram Krishna 
The Maoist conflict created an unexpected opportunity for 
minorities and women to press for meaningful inclusion. 
The Nepal Federation of Indigenous Nationalities (NEFIN) 
has called for constitutional changes, including 
proportional representation, restructuring of the state 
(federalism or provincial autonomy), reservations and 
language rights.121 Perhaps hoping to undercut Maoist 
claims to speak on behalf of a dispossessed majority, 
almost all political parties and the palace have endorsed 
some compensatory and remedial measures, like regional 
autonomy, electoral reform and reservations. The August 
2003 position paper issued by the Thapa government in 
the context of negotiations with the Maoists, for example, 
endorsed proportional representation, inclusion of 
minorities in the upper house of parliament, education and 
employment reservations, and reserved seats for women.122 
The UML has long had minority rights, including 
reservations and language rights, in its manifesto.123 
Congress, which disfavours electoral reform and 
federalism, would endorse a reservations system.124 
Although the designation of the state as Hindu and the 
bar on conversion are deeply unpopular among janajatis 
(ethnic minorities) and dalits, the mainstream parties other 
than the UML, are unwilling to challenge this aspect of 
monarchical legitimacy.125 Notwithstanding this loose and 
partial consensus, complex technical issues pertaining to 
implementation need to be resolved with compensatory 
and related reform measures. 
C. SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNANCE 
Dispersion of representation, policy-making authority 
and fiscal responsibility among sub-national units, such 
as provinces, zones or districts, is one mechanism for 
 
 
Timalsina (ed.), Some Landmark Decisions of the Supreme 
Court of Nepal (Kathmandu. 2003), p. 50.  
121 Crisis Group interview with Om Gurung, Chairman of 
Nefin, Lalitpur, 20 October 2004; "Draft Indigenous 
Peoples/Nationalities Kathmandu Declaration -- 2004", 
Kathmandu, 9 August 2004. 
122 "Highlights of proposals of forward-looking reforms 
proposed by His Majesty's Government of Nepal", 17 August 
2003, pp. 1-2. 
123 Krishna Hachhethu, "Nepal: Party Manifesto and Election", 
Nepali Journal of Contemporary Studies, vol. III, no. 1, March 
2003, p. 34. The most recent UML manifesto also commits the 
party to remedying social exclusion, albeit in vaguer terms. 
"The Proposal for the Resolution of National Problem", Central 
Committee of the UML, January 2004, pp. 9-11. 
124 Crisis Group interview with Ram Sharan Mahat, Congress 
Central Working Committee member, Kathmandu, 5 October 
2004. 
125 Crisis Group interviews with dalit activists, Kathmandu 
and Lalitpur, October 2004. The UML supports a secular state. 
Central Committee of the UML, op. cit., p. 9.  
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breaking the political monopoly of the Kathmandu-
based elite. This could be done in various ways. An 
important distinction can be drawn between systems in 
which each constituent unit has symmetrical powers, 
like Switzerland and Australia, and systems in which 
certain units have heightened autonomy, like Quebec in 
Canada.126 Another critical question concerns the criteria 
for boundary demarcation, which can include ethnicity, 
language and administrative convenience.127 A third 
consideration is the precise allocation of responsibilities 
-- fiscal and policy-making autonomy and representation 
-- between centre and region, and the extent of over-ride 
power that the centre might have. 
The debate on regional autonomy and federal structures is 
undeveloped, with little attention yet on the practicalities 
of instituting novel, complex and expensive governmental 
institutions across Nepal's challenging terrain. One 
prominent idea involves "ethnic homelands", and the 
Maoists' "autonomous governments" have been 
demarcated along supposedly ethnic lines. This notion, 
although a response to valid concerns about historical 
injustice and continuing ethnic subordination, could 
generate new conflict. If radical ethnic demands shape 
mainstream janajati politics, they would almost certainly 
trigger deep unease, if not violent pre-emptive action, by 
the dominant ethnic and caste groups. Territorial division 
along ethnic lines, moreover, risks consolidating new 
injustice, rather than more fairly allocating political power. 
A system of sub-national units with substantial, 
constitutionally guaranteed taxation, spending and public 
policy powers could, however, be achieved without using 
explicitly ethnic lines. The committee that drafted the 
1990 Constitution considered a zonal administrative 
system but was discouraged by Prime Minister Krishna 
Bhattarai.128 Elections within sub-national units, 
particularly with proportional electoral mechanisms, 
would give communities that previously lacked 
representation in Kathmandu more forums in which to 
compete without entrenching ethnic and caste differences 
or favouring territorially concentrated groups over 
geographically dispersed ones. 
 
 
126 For elaboration, see Yash Ghai, "Ethnicity and Autonomy: 
A Framework for Analysis", in Yash Ghai (ed.), Autonomy 
and Ethnicity: Negotiating Competing Claims in Multi-Ethnic 
States (Cambridge, 2000), pp. 8-25. 
127 India reconfigured its federal classifications in 1956 due 
to violent linguistic protests. T.V. Sathyamurthy, "Impact of 
Centre-State Relations on Indian Politics: An Interpretative 
Reckoning 1947-1987", in Partha Chatterjee (ed.), State and 
Politics in India (New Delhi, 1997), pp. 238-242.  
128 Crisis Group interview with former Justice Biswanath 
Upadhyay, Kathmandu, 29 September 2004.  
Many such divisions are possible. An analyst notes that 
the Panchayat-era system -- five zones running north to 
south to match geography -- could be applied in a new 
federalism.129 However, India's post-independence 
experience is also instructive: despite Nehru's determined 
opposition, the somewhat arbitrarily demarcated provinces 
inherited from British rule were largely redrawn along 
linguistic lines in 1959, following mass popular campaigns. 
The process of division of larger states into smaller, more 
linguistically or culturally homogeneous units continued 
throughout the rest of the twentieth century. This continual 
revision has at least demonstrated the value of the 
Indian Constitution's flexibility and successive central 
governments' willingness to bow to political pressure and 
consider revising arrangements in the light of changing 
circumstances. 
Whatever model is chosen must match Nepal's limited 
administrative capacities and fiscal realities. A system that 
could not deliver services would hardly further social 
inclusion. Any new government would risk becoming a 
new vehicle for corruption and patronage.130 Moreover, 
a sub-national system of governments cannot function 
without sufficient fiscal resources, which entails a national 
system of fiscal redistribution. Of Nepal's 75 districts, 64 
are in deficit.131 In the wake of Prime Minister Deuba's 
dissolution of local governments, sub-national structures 
are weak, with district government emasculated by state 
security forces, who wield de facto control. A geographic 
division that ignored these administrative and fiscal 
weaknesses, as the ethnic homelands scheme does, would 
deliver neither representation nor economic development.132 
There are numerous models for distribution of powers 
between national and regional levels. India's experience 
of cooperative federalism has not been a paragon of 
administrative virtue, given New Delhi's tendency to 
seize political control of provinces, but some Indian 
mechanisms for coordinating policy and fiscal 
redistribution bear study. Its 1947 Constitution (Part XI) 
lists central and provincial competences; the distribution 
of authority, however, can be radically shifted from 
federal to unitary by emergency powers, a provision 
 
 
129 Crisis Group interview, Lalitpur, 20 October 2004. 
130 See Joanna Pfaff-Czarnecka, "High Expectations, Deep 
Disappointments: Politics, State and Society in Nepal after 
1990", in Michael Hutt (ed.), Himalayan People's War 
(Bloomington, 2004), pp. 175-177.  
131 Harka Gurung, Fragile Districts, Futile Decentralisation 
(Kathmandu, 2003), p. 19.  
132 The optimistic response of ethnic homeland advocates is 
that homelands will discover hitherto untapped resources 
that will allow them to be fiscally independent. Crisis Group 
interview with ethnic activist, Kathmandu, October 2004. 
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Nepal would have to consider carefully.133 India also has 
a constitutionally-mandated Finance Commission, "a 
quasi-arbitral body whose function is to do justice between 
the Centre and the states".134 It is supplemented by a 
Planning Commission, which lacks a constitutional 
mandate. While both bodies are much criticised for their 
centripetal influence, commentators suggest that without 
the finance commission, at least, "the distribution of 
revenues would have degenerated into something close 
to open warfare".135 
The South African model of cooperative government 
does not promote ethnic division or strong regionalism 
but gives provinces a powerful voice in national law-
making through a presence in the second house. As in 
India, the constitution provides a body for federal fiscal 
co-ordination, the Financial and Fiscal Commission.136 
By contrast, systems that have had centuries to develop 
cultural and social roots are less useful as models for 
Nepal, where a system of sub-national units must 
overcome a history of centralisation. The Swiss system of 
cantons -- "de facto independent mini-states politically 
dominated by the elite of their capital cities" -- developed 
over centuries.137 Equitable treatment of linguistic groups 
could develop by informal arrangements, rather than 
constitution-making. Nepal would benefit more from 
looking to countries with a history similar to its own. 
Local government is another resource for sharing power. 
Until the end of the Panchayat era, monarchical 
government stymied efforts to distribute authority.138 
Local self-government has been promised by the centre 
since the never-enacted 1948 Government of Nepal Act, 
which envisaged village and town councils.139 It was 
 
 
133 Granville Austin, The Indian Constitution: Cornerstone 
of a Nation (New Delhi, 2002), pp. 195-203, 207-208.  
134 Granville Austin, Working a Democratic Constitution: A 
History of the Indian Experience (New Delhi, 1999), p. 615; 
Constitution of India, Article 280. Article 263 authorises 
India's president to establish a council to inquire and make 
recommendations about disputes between the states and 
between a state and the central government.  
135 Austin, Working a Democratic Constitution, op. cit., p. 
618. For further details of the revenue-sharing provisions, see 
Austin, The Indian Constitution, op. cit., pp. 217-234. 
136 Heinz Klug, "How the Centre Holds: Managing Claims 
for Regional and Ethnic Autonomy in a Democratic South 
Africa", in Yash Ghai (ed.), Autonomy and Ethnicity, op. cit., 
pp. 113-117.  
137 See Andreas Wimmer, Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic 
Conflict: Shadows of Modernity (Cambridge, 2002), pp. 225-
249. 
138 Pfaff-Czarnecka, "Vestiges and Visions, op. cit., p. 436. 
139 Articles 16-21 of the Government of Nepal Act, 1948, 
reprinted in Dahal, op. cit. pp. 290-291. The 1951 Interim 
Government Act of Nepal also promised village Panchayats. 
See ibid, p. 309. A 1919 regulation establishing some 
followed by the moribund 1956 Panchayat Act.140 Laws 
purporting to decentralise were passed in 1965, 1975, 
1979, 1982, and 1984 but they were actually vehicles for 
central control, rather than genuine opportunities for 
local decision-making. Post-1990 five-year development 
plans also promised decentralisation but implementation 
and the distribution of funds fell short.141 
Most recently, the government passed the 1999 Local 
Self-Government Act, which has allowed village 
development committees to decide on some development 
spending and begun to shift responsibility away from line 
ministries.142 Experts in local government also view the 
2002 legislation as an incremental, but positive, change,143 
though the Maoist insurgency has driven out most local-
level government, impeding its implementation and any 
assessment of whether it could be a basis for further 
devolution.144 
Most decentralisation has been cosmetic, and political 
will remains weak,145 so scepticism about local 
government is understandable. Nevertheless, reform of 
local government, the level with which most people 
interact, will be a critical part of dispersing political 
power to communities traditionally outside politics. 
Devolution of power may also appeal to strategic analysts 
who worry about Nepal's longer-term political stability. 
As an important way of moderating the "all or nothing" 
nature of power struggles in Kathmandu it could reduce 
the risks involved in future political transitions. 
D. ELECTORAL REFORM 
Nepal's 205 constituencies elect one parliamentary 
representative each. Redistricting to account for population 
shifts occurs decennially, most recently in 2001.146 
Suggestions to reform the first-past-the-post system have 
 
 
powers for Kathmandu municipality is the earliest example 
of devolution. Gurung, op. cit., p. 1. 
140 Joshi and Rose, op. cit. p. 397.  
141 Crisis Group interview with lawyer, Kathmandu, October 
2004; Dev Raj Dahal, Hari Uprety and Phanindra Subba, Good 
Governance and Decentralisation in Nepal (Kathmandu, 2002), 
pp. 71-79.  
142 Crisis Group interview with Harka Gurung, New Era 
Foundation, Kathmandu, 18 October 2004.  
143 Crisis Group interview with local government expert, Lalitpur, 
October 2004. 
144 Crisis Group interview with Nepali anthropologist, 
Kathmandu, 16 October 2004. 
145 Gurung, op. cit., p. 5. 
146 Crisis Group interview with Ram Sharan Mahat, member 
of Nepali Congress Central Working Committee, Kathmandu, 
5 October 2004. 
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been aired by academics and ethnic activists,147 who say 
it allows a mere plurality, not necessarily a majority, to 
rule148 and argue that a proportional system would better 
reflect the country's ethnic diversity.149 Multi-member 
districts elected by proportional representation have been 
proposed150 as has the German double-ballot,151 in which 
each voter selects a candidate from a single-member 
constituency and then makes a second choice of a closed 
party list in his or her region.152 
Hopes that a proportional system will draw previously 
excluded ethnic groups or castes into the electoral 
system may be overstated. The post-1990 electoral 
dispensation did not collapse voters' choices entirely or 
shut out minority voices. In the 1991 election, twenty 
parties ran and seven obtained seats in the House of 
Representatives.153 In 1995, 24 parties ran, with five 
succeeding; in 1999, seven of 25 obtained seats.154 The 
proportion of ethnic representatives varied between 30.2 
per cent in 1991 and 23.9 per cent in 1999.155 The post-
1990 system thus made it difficult but far from impossible 
for smaller parties to enter parliament. Those like the 
NWPP and the NSP, which have regional strongholds, 
were able to retain a parliamentary presence 
notwithstanding the pressure the plurality-vote system 
imposed. 
The reasons for the political weakness of ethnic groups 
must be sought elsewhere. First, they have been weak in 
political mobilisation. Leaders of caste groups in 
Janakpur, for example, concede that ethnic communities 
have yet to mobilise blocs of votes effectively to bargain 
 
 
147 Crisis Group interview with Tek Tamrakar, lawyer, Pro 
Public, Lalitpur, 13 October 2004.  
148 Candidates winning with more than 50 per cent of the vote 
decreased from 79 in 1991 to sixteen in 1999. Krishna Khanal, 
"Election Procedures and Malpractice: Problems of Ensuring 
Free and Fair Election", Nepali Journal of Contemporary 
Studies, vol. III, no. 1, 2003, p. 73. 
149 Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu, October 2004. 
150 Krishna P. Khanal, "Consideration of possible model of 
Proportional Representation for Nepal", updated, unpublished 
paper. 
151 Crisis Group interview with Krishna Khanal, Tribhuvan 
University, Kirtipur, 7 October 2004.  
152 Pippa Norris, Electoral Engineering (Cambridge, 2004), 
pp. 56-57. Adjustments are made to ensure "that seats are 
proportional to second votes cast for party lists". 
153 Ram Kumar Dahal, "Election and People's Participation 
in Nepal", Nepali Journal of Contemporary Studies, vol. IV, 
no. 1, March 2004, p. 97.  
154 Ibid, pp. 98-99. 
155 Sant B. Gurung, "The Indigenous Nationalities of Nepal: 
Social Setting and Institutional Efforts", in Mukti Rijal (ed.), 
Readings on Governance and Development, vol. III 
(Kathmandu, 2004), p. 21.  
with political parties.156 The first-past-the-post system, in 
fact, gives an advantage to a determined, numerically 
concentrated ethnic group if it can keep its vote together. 
This has been amply demonstrated in Indian politics, not 
least in the populous states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, 
bordering Nepal, where the rise of low-caste parties 
based on the careful construction of "vote-banks" has 
been one of the most notable features of electoral politics 
in the last two decades. 
Secondly, the transition to a more proportional system 
would not necessarily loosen the grip of the major national 
parties. With almost a decade and three rounds of 
parliamentary elections to have established geographically 
dispersed cadres, they are likely to retain significant 
organisational advantages in any election not marred by 
Maoist or state-sponsored violence.157 Ethnic parties, even 
if permitted by a change in the constitutional ground 
rules, might be unable to make up ground lost in the first 
decade of democracy. Indeed, a proportional system that 
used lists drawn up by the party leadership would further 
centralise control and advantage the existing parliamentary 
parties and the elites within them.158 
No clear link has been shown internationally between 
proportionality and minority group satisfaction with 
electoral systems.159 Some fare well under first-past-
the-post because territorial concentration facilitates 
parliamentary representation. The Plaid Cymru party in 
Wales (UK) is an example. A shift to proportionality 
would not necessarily improve representation of 
geographically concentrated Nepali ethnic groups.  
Moreover, there is little evidence to support the optimistic 
assessment of some social scientists that proportionality 
would encourage responsible, stable coalitions in 
parliament. 160 To the contrary, it might reduce the already 
precarious stability of governments.161 The experience of 
 
 
156 Crisis Group interviews, Janakpur, October 2004.  
157 Standing alone, "the introduction of PR may not produce 
more parties" for "pure PR is a no-effect electoral system", 
Giovanni Sartori, Comparative Constitutional Engineering: 
An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes (New 
York, 1997), pp. 46-47 (emphasis in original). 
158 The party-list system can help preserve party control. It 
was introduced in 2004 for the Russian federal Duma, 
combined with a 7 per cent threshold, presumably to ensure 
that only parties acceptable to the Kremlin succeeded in federal 
elections. Jonathan Steele, "Doing Well out of War", London 
Review of Books, 21 October 2004, p. 29. 
159 Pippa Norris, Electoral Engineering (Cambridge, 2004), 
pp. 224-227. 
160 Khanal, "Consideration on possible model of Proportional 
Representation", op. cit., p. 12. 
161 According to Justice Biswanath Upadhyay, Chair of the 
1990 Constitution Recommendation Commission, fear of 
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the 1995 parliament, which witnessed nine governing 
coalitions, hints at heightened costs162 that may actually 
undermine consensus-building, the putative benefit of 
a proportional system.163 Coalitions between 1995 and 
1999 evinced little ideological coherence. Rather, 
they appeared to be largely opportunistic. Under such 
circumstances, more proportionality might bring about 
"heterogeneous coalitions between partners or, indeed, 
non-partners that play a veto game against each other".164 
Electoral reform, therefore, should not be accompanied 
by expectations of a radical shift in the political landscape. 
But this does not mean that the agenda should be 
abandoned. The present system is widely perceived as 
reinforcing high-caste Hindu dominance. Keeping it in 
place would signal a failure of political will for change. 
Electoral reform, in contrast, would telegraph a 
commitment to broadening popular involvement in 
politics, adding legitimacy to any new constitutional order. 
Insistence on retaining the first-past-the-post system 
may be perceived similarly as a tool for excluding the 
traditionally marginal janajati and caste groups. The 
election for a constitutional assembly, should one be 
convened, might be an opportunity to introduce a revised 
system that could fall between total first-past-the-post 
and total proportional representation. An expansion of 
candidacy and seat reservations for women would also 
be a logical option.165 
One important and simple measure could be a repeal of 
the ban on ethnic parties in Article 113(3) of the 1990 
Constitution, which, as noted, has been applied unevenly 
and has not functioned as the drafters expected. 
According to then Minister of Law Nilamber Acharya, it 
was believed minorities would be better off trying to gain 
influence through the major political parties.166 Those 
parties, however, have failed to take ethnic and minority 
issues seriously. Allowing ethnic parties to compete 
might force mainstream parties to change by increasing 
competition for minority votes. Ethnic parties, even 
 
 
instability was why the first-past-the-post system was chosen, 
even though the drafters knew a proportional model would be 
more representative. Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, 29 
September 2004. 
162 David N. Gellner, "Transformations of the Nepali State", in 
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(New Delhi, 2003), p. 14.  
163 Commentators often assume that because governance in a 
proportional system needs compromise and consensus-building, 
that will occur, e.g., Wolf Linder, "Political Structures and 
Multicultural Conflict", in Mukti Rijal (ed.), Readings on 
Governance and Development, vol. III (Kathmandu, 2004). 
164 Sartori, op. cit., p. 60. 
165 This and other electoral system questions will be addressed 
in a forthcoming Crisis Group report on political party reform. 
166 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, 28 September 2004. 
if relatively ineffective on a national level themselves, 
give minorities more leverage within mainstream parties. 
Furthermore, permitting minority parties might also 
relieve some of the pressure for ethnic homelands. 
E. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
The problematic issue of control over the Royal 
Nepalese Army (RNA) has been brought to the fore by 
the Maoist insurgency. RNA reluctance to respond to 
the orders of the elected government came to a head in 
the summer of 2001. Since the army's deployment under 
the November 2001 state of emergency, its role in 
military and political affairs has become progressively 
entrenched, initially through the creation of a unified 
command that gave it control over civilian police and 
most prominently since February 2005, when its support 
for the palace and the royal coup was both essential and 
explicit. 
The drafters of the 1990 Constitution intended to vest 
control of the military entirely with the civilian, democratic 
institutions. Senior army officers resisted, telling the 
CRC chairman they preferred to remain under the king's 
control.167 According to the chairman, they suggested 
(unsuccessfully) a National Defence Council with two 
civilians and up to eleven military officials.168 
Under the 1990 Constitution, the king remains supreme 
commander of the RNA, who, on advice of the prime 
minister, can "operate and use" the RNA and appoint its 
commander-in-chief. Operational control lies with the 
National Defence Council, which includes the prime 
minister, the defence minister and the commander-in-
chief.169 In theory, elected officials dominate but in 
practice the RNA has resisted, most openly in July 2001, 
when the army declined to obey Prime Minister Girija 
Prasad Koirala's orders to move on Maoists in Rolpa 
district, precipitating his resignation. Under the current 
administration, of course, there is no prime minister, and 
the king has retained the defence portfolio himself. 
RNA officers justify their resistance to parliamentary 
control by raising concerns that civilian governments 
might corrupt and politicise the army.170 The post-1990 
civilian governments, in the army's view, never accepted 
 
 
167 According to Justice Upadhyay, the commander-in-chief had 
two suggestions: that the army be under the king's control, and 
the country's sovereignty be vested in the king. Crisis Group 
interview, Kathmandu, 29 September 2004. 
168 Ibid. 
169 Articles 118 and 119 of the 1990 Constitution of Nepal. 
170 Crisis Group interview with retired colonel, Kathmandu, 
October 2004, who also blamed the civilian governments for 
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the need to regulate it in a non-partisan way. The roots 
of this distrust go back to the 1950s and concern over 
"Congressisation of the administrative machinery".171 
Members of the Mukti Sena, the Congress' insurgent army 
formed in Indian exile in 1950, were drafted into the police, 
resulting in continuing close ties between the party and 
that force.172 The army seems to assume it would meet 
the same fate were it to submit to civilian governments. 
Its resistance to civilian control continued even after the 
beginning of the Maoist insurgency, justified by the 
argument the government had no "socio-economic 
program" to accompany its military strategy.173 
Stronger mechanisms for parliamentary control of 
the RNA will be a precondition for progress in peace 
negotiations and for future governmental stability. 
The absence of such control was one of the reasons 
given by the Maoists for refusing to talk to the 
Deuba government.174 Until civilian negotiators can 
make credible commitments on the RNA's behalf, the 
Maoists have reason to be doubtful of talks. Moreover, 
countries in which the military remains dominant, like 
Pakistan, are hardly models for stability and good 
governance.175 Substantial institutional changes are 
necessary for Nepal's long-term stability.176 
Since 1990, prime ministers have tended to keep the 
defence portfolio for themselves, with the ministry 
remaining little more than a "procurement agency".177 
As long as this practice continues, institutional reform 
will be difficult.178 In addition to strengthening the 
defence ministry, a non-partisan mechanism of 
parliamentary control might be considered in the process 
of constitutional change. For example, a parliamentary 
committee with opposition representation could be 
empowered to take key decisions about the RNA.179 
 
 
171 Joshi and Rose, op. cit. p. 320. 
172 Crisis Group interview with Nepali military analyst, 
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173 Crisis Group interview with former army officer, 
Kathmandu, October 2004; Bhusal, op. cit., p. 130.  
174 See "Conditional", Kantipur, 26 September 2004 (quoting 
CPN(M) spokesperson Krishna Bahadur Mahara). 
175 See, for example, Crisis Group Asia Report N°40, 
Pakistan: Transition to Democracy, 3 October 2002. 
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Crisis Group Report, Dealing with a Human Rights Crisis, op. 
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177 Crisis Group interview with Western diplomat, April 2003. 
178 Felipe Agüero, "Toward Civilian Supremacy in South 
America", in Larry Diamond et al. (eds.), Consolidating the 
Third Wave Democracies (Baltimore, 1997), p. 199. 
179 Crisis Group interview with human rights activist, 
Kathmandu, 14 October 2004. 
Some analysts argue that a transition to civilian control 
of the RNA must be handled delicately, lest it precipitate 
more aggressive military intervention in politics. They 
suggest the king could play a useful role as a figurehead 
and symbol of unity.180 
Other national institutions could help supervise and restrain 
the RNA. The 1990 Constitution restricts civilian courts 
from intervening with military courts except in limited 
circumstances,181 and they have been reluctant to do so. 
The insurgency, and the accompanying acceleration in 
human-rights violations by the state, have only added 
urgency to reform in this area. The United Nations is 
establishing a human rights monitoring mission in 
accordance with an April 2005 memorandum of 
understanding between the Nepali government and the 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. Although 
this may help address immediate issues, the fundamental 
tensions will have to be dealt with in any process of 
constitutional change. 
 
 
180 Crisis Group interview, Lalitpur, October 2004. 
181 Article 88(2)(a) provides that "[t]he Supreme Court shall 
not be deemed to have power…to interfere with proceedings 
and decisions of the Military Court except on the ground of 
absence of jurisdiction or on the ground that a proceeding 
has been initiated against, or punishment given to, a non-
military person for an act other than an offence relating to 
the Army". This appears not to restrict the Court's power to 
void a law under Article 88(1).  
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V. BREAKING THE STALEMATE: 
KEY ACTORS' POSITIONS 
Just as evaluations of the constitutional situation vary 
widely, so do views on how to move forward. The palace, 
parties and Maoists have offered different roadmaps for 
resolving the political and military crisis. Intentions shift 
as political fortunes change. The eighteen-point agenda 
drawn up by parties in the aftermath of King Gyanendra's 
October 2002 move had faded well before his second 
takeover.182 2004 saw increased support for a constitutional 
assembly within several parties, including Congress and 
UML, largely driven by younger cadres.183 In particular, 
the nine-day imprisonment of three student leaders on 
sedition charges was a "radicalising moment" for student 
groups.184 The increased frequency of anti-monarchy 
slogans in student protests since late 2003 suggests that 
King Gyanendra, through unwillingness to relinquish 
power, may have seeded a generational shift towards a 
republic. 
The royal coup of February 2005 has, unintentionally, 
played a major role in uniting the political parties and 
hardening their position towards the monarchy. With the 
development of a common minimum program shared by 
seven mainstream parties, a clear program has at last 
emerged from the centre ground. It calls for restoration of 
the 1999 parliament, negotiations with the Maoists and 
then the election of a constitutional assembly. In the 
words of UML leader Jhalanath Khanal, reinstatement of 
the dissolved parliament is the "entry point" to a stable 
peace process and a constitutional assembly the "exit 
point".185 Congress President Koirala has reiterated that 
the king must choose between complete democracy and a 
republic. For him, the agenda of the seven-party alliance 
is a comprehensive roadmap for all who want democracy 
and peace.186 If the parties remain united, they will not 
only put pressure on the palace but also undermine that 
 
 
182 Even opposition parties such as the NSP and Congress 
placed little weight on the eighteen-point agenda, Crisis Group 
interviews with opposition politicians, Kathmandu, October 
2004. Its main features included curtailing the king's powers, 
bringing the RNA under parliamentary control, redressing 
exclusion by ending discrimination against women, ethnic and 
caste groups, resolving the citizenship problem in the Tarai, 
formulating a comprehensive, forward-looking political agenda 
to resolve the Maoist conflict peacefully, and introducing 
concrete anti-corruption programs. 
183 Crisis Group interview with democracy expert, Kathmandu, 
28 September 2004. 
184 Crisis Group interview with Congress student leader, 
Kathmandu, 5 October 2004. 
185 "Parties have put constituent assembly on agenda: Khanal", 
www.kantipuronline.com, 28 May 2005. 
186 Ibid. 
Maoist case for continuing the armed struggle. Consensus 
on a constitutional assembly agenda would require 
complex bargaining over scope and modalities but could 
offer the best hope for a negotiated peace. 
A. THE PALACE 
The palace has a simple bottom line: it will resist any 
constitutional change that could endanger the monarchy 
or reduce its powers. Beyond this, it can be flexible but 
the basic condition of self-preservation leaves little room 
for compromise. Until the dismissal of the Deuba-led 
coalition in February 2005, King Gyanendra's stated 
preference was for general elections to be held before 
April 2005. A source close to the palace explained his 
rationale in these terms: "From the king's point of view, 
holding elections would put the 1990 Constitution back 
on track…the king feels that once parliament is back, 
the spectre of Article 127 will go away".187 
The king's focus on elections, however, was always 
open to less charitable interpretation. He may have 
been looking to February 1959, when, after eight years 
of pressure on the palace to fulfil its 1951 promise of 
democratic government, King Mahendra finally agreed 
to hold the first democratic elections.188 At the time, it 
was widely believed he did so in the belief a hung 
parliament would result, and he would maintain 
effective control.189 In the event, the Nepali Congress 
party obtained 37.2 per cent of the vote and 74 seats 
out of 109.190 Dissatisfied with his limited role, the 
king began issuing veiled warnings in January 1960 
and at the end of the year took power after arresting the 
cabinet.191 Like his father, Gyanendra could have been 
hoping for either a hung parliament, which would have 
allowed him to play an instrumental role in endorsing 
coalitions, or one dominated by parties close to the 
palace. 
Alternatively, the February 2005 royal coup has added 
weight to the argument that the king had deliberately 
tasked Deuba with an impossible challenge.192 By setting 
the government to fail, the king guaranteed himself a 
further opportunity to justify extending his powers. Even 
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Towards a Lasting Peace in Nepal: The Constitutional Issues 
Crisis Group Asia Report N°99, 15 June 2005 Page 21 
 
 
 
as Deuba refused to indulge in the pessimism of his own 
cabinet members about the unpromising security situation, 
the chief of army staff was hinting to the diplomatic 
community that the RNA was making no plans to secure 
the supposed polls.193 
In his proclamation of 1 February 2005, the king spoke of 
restoring multi-party democracy within three years but 
talk of elections was notable by its absence. Subsequently 
the royal government announced that it will hold municipal 
elections by April 2006,194 and Council of Ministers Vice 
Chairman Peter Giri told the press that municipal elections 
will lead to full parliamentary polls.195 The modalities 
of such elections -- such as whether there will be party 
participation or candidate pre-qualification restrictions -- 
have not been clarified, and the initial response of the 
mainstream parties has been dismissive.196  
The effective suspension of the 1990 settlement has only 
intensified the king's need to insist that his actions are 
aimed at protecting it. This may increase royal resistance 
to any constitutional change because of the fear that 
acknowledging the weaknesses of the 1990 dispensation 
may undermine the argument that its protection warrants 
a royal takeover. Nevertheless, there have previously 
been indications that some constitutional amendment 
would be acceptable to the king.197 For example, the 
Thapa government's 17 August 2003 concept paper, 
prepared during talks with the Maoists, endorses this. 
Gyanendra may have more reservations about the method 
of changing the constitution, particularly the idea of a 
constitutional assembly. Pro-palace politicians suggest he 
fears that such a body "would be a method of introducing 
a republican system".198 But some evidence suggests 
that the king could accept the notion if a constitutional 
assembly's purpose was not to usher in a republic.199 
Indeed in the longer term, the palace may even seek 
amendments if it feels they might increase the role of the 
monarchy, as outlined in Section  III.C above. 
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Giri", kantipuronline, 15 April 2005. 
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197 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, October 2004. 
198 Crisis Group interview with RPP politician, Kathmandu, 
October 2004. 
199 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, October 2004. Akhilesh 
Upadhyay, "New Cabinet and Old Problems", The Nation, 18 
July 2004, p. 21. 
B. NEPALI CONGRESS 
The Nepali Congress party, led by Girija Prasad Koirala, 
has long contended that neither the political nor the military 
conflict can be resolved without a return to representative 
government by restoration of the 1999 parliament and 
formation of an all-party government from that body.200 
The all-party government would negotiate with the Maoists 
and organise a process of constitutional change. The royal 
coup has not altered the fundamental stance of the party on 
the restoration of parliament. It has, however, emboldened 
those within it, especially within the student wing, the 
Nepal Students Union, who were already arguing for 
a republic. Despite Koirala's release from house arrest, the 
continued detention of pro-republic Congress leaders such 
as Narahari Acharya suggests that the palace deems them 
a real threat. Meanwhile, Koirala himself has hinted that 
the Congress commitment to constitutional monarchy 
should not be taken for granted. When asked in a 
newspaper interview if his party was divided over the 
choice between a constitutional monarchy and a republic, 
his response was terse: "[Congress] has always adhered to 
constitutional monarchy. But I don't know where we will 
stand now. It would be better if you asked the king this 
question".201 
In contrast to those of its main rival, the UML, Congress 
election manifestos from 1991 to 1999 did not feature 
suggestions for constitutional amendment.202 The party 
dislikes electoral reform and federalism but would 
endorse a reservations system.203 It posits three alternative 
routes for that change: a constitutional amendment, a 
referendum or a constitutional assembly.204 As a principal 
actor in the 1990 "people's movement" that paved the way 
for the current constitution, it "does not want to be seen as 
the party that walked over that constitution".205 Therefore, 
it prefers the amendment route. Congress officials have 
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generally rejected moving directly to a constitutional 
assembly, arguing that "would give a tremendous boost to 
the Maoists, who will be seen as the victorious power".206 
The royal coup has, however, encouraged some within 
the party, as in other mainstream parties, to be more 
flexible on the possibility of accepting a constitutional 
assembly. 
Party workers acknowledge that other parties fear 
parliamentary restoration is a way for Congress to 
reassert itself.207 The 1999 House of Representatives, 
which succeeded the hung 1994 parliament, was 
dominated by a united Congress party that won 111 of 
205 seats.208 Congress officials, however, protest that 
their interest lies in a return to legitimate, constitutional 
rule. They put forward the referendum option as a 
means to allow reconsideration of "rigid features" of 
the 1990 Constitution that cannot be reviewed via an 
amendment process.209 While the 1990 Constitution 
has no referendum mechanism, Congress argues that 
the reference to popular sovereignty in the preamble 
could justify a referendum on questions such as the 
need for a constitutional assembly or maintenance of 
multi-party democracy.210 
Despite the party line, discord over the consequences of 
different strategies persist within the leadership and the 
rank and file. A lawyer who participated in internal 
meetings in 2004 concerning peaceful solutions to the 
conflict observed disarray on diagnosis of the conflict 
and a wide divergence in proposed solutions.211 Student 
leaders endorse not only a constitutional assembly, but 
also republicanism.212 Before the royal coup, even some 
members of the party elite had argued strongly for a 
constitutional assembly and predicted that their position 
would be endorsed by the party convention, scheduled 
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209 The 1990 Constitution provides for legislative amendment in 
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212 Crisis Group interview with Congress student leaders, 
Kathmandu, March 2005. 
for March 2005 but now indefinitely postponed.213 At a 
local level, members' desire for constitutional change 
outruns that of their leaders. In Janakpur, for example, 
members of district committees insist on the importance 
of constitutional change to clarify citizenship rules, a 
matter of local importance in the Tarai.214 
C. THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF NEPAL 
(UNIFIED MARXIST-LENINIST) 
Like Congress, the UML has argued that "until [the 
country goes] back to the democratic process, it can't 
resolve the party/king conflict".215 Until early 2005 the 
UML did not view restoration of the 1999 parliament as 
the preferred avenue for renewing the government's 
democratic pedigree. Rather, it favoured formation of an 
all-party government, followed by establishment of a 
common minimum program as a framework for peace 
negotiations. Upon reaching a consensus with the 
Maoists, a roundtable conference would be convened 
with "[d]elegates of political parties represented in the 
dissolved House of Representatives, the CPN (Maoist) 
and other individuals" to decide on "whether to go for 
the amendment of the constitution or to opt for a new 
constitution".216 That interim government then would 
hold elections for a constitutional assembly or a 
parliament to amend the constitution.217 
Nevertheless, in late 2004 several senior UML office-
holders openly expressed a willingness to accept 
restoration of parliament. They included central 
committee member and Minister for Labour Raghuji 
Pant218 and his colleagues Bamdev Gautam and Pradip 
Nepal.219 Following expiration of the 13 January 2005 
deadline for the Maoists to join talks, General Secretary 
Madhav Nepal proposed reactivating parliament's upper 
house and reinstating former elected representatives on 
local government bodies as a compromise first step.220 
The UML has thus long been open to various modalities of 
constitutional change. The party, moreover, has expressed 
dissatisfaction with sections of the constitution since 1991. 
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While it remains committed, at least on paper, to a secular 
state with linguistic equality for all communities, it had 
by 1994 retreated from republican demands and adopted 
almost social democratic positions.221 According to 
Madhav Nepal, although the UML is open to proposals 
on how to accomplish constitutional change, it "does 
not think there's a need for a new constitution or a 
constitutional assembly. But for the sake of [bringing 
in] the Maoists, we would agree to a constitutional 
assembly".222 Such flexibility, argues another central 
committee member, also "helps other parties by keeping 
all the options open".223 
The UML's endorsement of the seven-party program 
incorporating a constitutional assembly is, therefore, not 
so surprising. But there are signs that the post-February 
2005 environment is bringing to the surface long-standing 
tensions within the party. While Madhav Nepal remained 
under house arrest, standing committee member Jhalanath 
Khanal became acting general secretary. Many party 
activists suspect that Madhav Nepal may be made a 
scapegoat for the failures of the party to put its mark on 
the Deuba government.224 Since his release on 1 May 
2005, he has been slightly bolder in calling for "total 
democracy and full-fledged sovereignty of the people" but 
has hedged his bets by urging all political forces to "remain 
under the constitution".225 If the seven-party agenda gains 
momentum, it will strengthen the position of Nepal 
personally and his party but if it falters, he will be accused 
of having submitted to a Congress agenda for no political 
benefit. 
D. OTHER POLITICAL PARTIES 
Five other parties were represented in the 1999 parliament: 
Congress (Democratic), the RPP, Nepal Sadbhavana Party 
(NSP), Janamorcha, and Nepal Workers and Peasants 
Party (NWPP). Before February 2005, Congress (D) 
argued that a government without periodic elections 
would be impossible, so a poll within the timeframe 
established by the king had to be the priority.226 At the 
district level, however, party workers admitted their 
inability to reach many areas due to the Maoists. Given 
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the party's organisational weaknesses, low national 
presence in comparison to the mainstream Congress and 
signal lack of achievement in government, its workers 
may have been relieved at the reprieve from an election. 
The royal coup also appears to have added momentum 
to efforts to patch up Deuba and Koirala's differences 
and reunite the two Congresses.227 
With regard to the insurgency, Congress (D) had seen 
the new High-Level Peace Committee (HLPC)228 as 
a vehicle for negotiations and settlement. Sufficient 
common ground for talks existed, party officials argued, 
because the Maoists had recognised the king's authority 
in demanding to speak with "the masters" rather than the 
Deuba government.229 Their view always appeared 
overoptimistic. Maoist recognition of the king as the 
embodiment of the "old" state does not preclude their 
desire to do away with that old state in favour of a new 
people's democracy. Moreover the HLPC, which had 
shown little signs of efficacy, was swiftly disbanded by 
the new royalist government. 
While in government, the Congress (D) proposed an 
amendment process, rather than a constitutional assembly. 
It was always, however, prepared to adjust to 
circumstances: Deuba, for example, supported a 
constitutional assembly until June 2004, when he entered 
government, and he declined to rule out such a body even 
while prime minister.230 As with the UML, Congress 
(D)'s support for the seven-party agenda for change via a 
constitutional assembly is not entirely surprising. Perhaps 
more significant is the question of whether public 
commitment to the same program will boost chances for 
Congress' reunification. 
Congress (D)'s former ally in government, the RPP, also 
endorsed the continuing vitality of the 1990 Constitution 
under the Deuba government. Its spokesperson explained 
that the party opposed restoration of parliament or a 
constitutional assembly because of the king's opposition 
to both.231 It argued that a government formed of all 
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parties represented in the 1999 parliament could 
simultaneously negotiate and prepare for elections. In 
2003, however, the party's third general assembly had 
endorsed constitutional change.232 Its national council in 
December 2004 endorsed a constitutional assembly as 
one possible option, a line advocated by certain senior 
RPP members for some time.233 Khem Raj Pandit, for 
example, has argued that because neither parliamentary 
restoration nor elections are possible, the government 
should talk to the Maoists with the goal of initiating a 
constitutional assembly -- the only vehicle for bringing 
the insurgents into the mainstream. By creating a public 
impression of internal debate, the RPP may have 
deliberately kept its options open as a deal-maker in case 
other parties decided to back a constitutional assembly, as 
they now have. 
The position on constitutional reform of the new Rastriya 
Janashakti Party (RJP), formed by RPP founder Surya 
Bahadur Thapa after he quit his old party, is not yet 
entirely clear. The RJP's first policy paper calls for 
certain major changes, such as an effective reservations 
system, proportional representation and decentralisation. 
It strongly endorses the need for the monarchy as a 
symbol of national unity while at the same time endorsing 
an unspecified process of "constitutional change/rewriting 
and modernisation".234 Neither the RPP nor the RJP has 
joined the seven-party alliance. 
The NSP's main faction, which did not join the Deuba 
government, identified an all-party consensus as central 
to progress. With a common position on the constitution, 
NSP officials argue, the parties could negotiate with the 
king. NSP places less emphasis on restoring parliament, 
despite having stood with Congress in opposition to the 
Deuba coalition, because it doubts parliament's ability to 
reach a consensus.235 According to its officials, there 
must be talks with the Maoists before constitutional 
changes. While it rejects the parliamentary amendment 
route as too cramped and the referendum path as 
favouring the larger parties, the NSP favours adopting a 
new constitution. At its grass-roots level, agitation for 
constitutional change -- most vocally via constitutional 
assembly -- is more pronounced.236 
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The NWPP and Janamorcha, despite being furthest from 
Congress ideologically, share the same prescription for 
dealing with the crisis: parliamentary restoration followed 
by formation of an all-party government. Both also 
endorse a constitutional assembly.237 Their leaders place 
more emphasis on the kind of constitutional changes 
they envisage, rather than on the method but they have 
backed the seven-party proposal. 
In short, party positions on immediate political transition 
and constitutional change have long been influenced by 
perceptions of short-term interest. Such self-interest, 
however, has its advantages. The parties' recognition 
that democratic governance is in their common interest -- 
indeed, the only justification for and basis of their authority 
-- has helped persuade them to rally around a common 
position to break the political stalemate. To this extent, 
King Gyanendra has greatly aided the political parties 
by bringing their shared interests into sharper focus. As 
many observers have pointed out, the royal coup achieved 
the seemingly impossible task of uniting Nepal's fractious 
parties and giving them the basis for a common agenda. 
Whether they will be able to bring their agenda to fruition, 
and whether there will be any consensus on the substance 
as well as process of reform, remains to be seen. But the 
common adoption of a constitutional assembly route for 
change offers the parties their best hope of forcing the 
palace and the Maoists to pay attention to them and their 
call for a democratic peace settlement. 
E. THE MAOISTS 
The Maoist agenda, which from inception included 
transformation of the state, has increasingly emphasised a 
process of constitutional change -- the holding of a 
constitutional assembly -- as a goal in itself. However, 
the Maoists resist suggestions that they have diluted their 
ultimate goal of a "New Democratic/People's Democratic 
Republic", which will be a "people's democratic 
dictatorship".238 Their support of a constitutional assembly 
must be treated with some scepticism in light of that 
ultimate aim. 
On 4 February 1996, before declaration of the "people's 
war", party ideologue Baburam Bhattarai sent then Prime 
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Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba 40 demands, warning that 
armed struggle would begin unless "positive indications" 
were forthcoming. The tenth demand was for a new 
constitution "drafted by representatives elected for the 
establishment of a people's democratic system".239 Until 
late 2001, when negotiations with a government headed 
by Deuba were ongoing, the Maoists continued to focus 
on a new republican constitution framed by the people. 
On 13 November 2001, they dropped this demand and 
shifted emphasis to the process-related call for an interim 
government followed by a constitutional assembly.240 
During the 2003 talks and again in February 2004, the 
CPN(M) insisted on the same framework for progress: 
"[a] roundtable conference, an interim government and 
election to a Constituent Assembly".241 Such an assembly 
would effect the transition from a capitalist democracy 
to a "full-fledged" democracy, or, in Bhattarai's words, 
"a democratic republic".242 According to the Maoists, "in a 
free and fair election the mandate of the Nepalese people 
would be in favour of a republic".243 The Maoists have 
detailed some of what they want in a new constitution, 
including land reforms, nationalisation of industries, a 
unified national army, and regional autonomy for ethnic 
groups.244 According to those close to the CPN(M), its 
focus on process does not represent a change of goals, 
but only their postponement in light of geopolitical 
concerns.245 
In the aftermath of the royal coup, the Maoists reached 
out to the mainstream parties with the suggestion of a 
united anti-monarchical front.246 The standard reaction 
of the parties has been that reconciliation remains 
possible but only if the Maoists renounce their armed 
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struggle. Nevertheless, the actions of the king have 
added weight to the Maoist analysis of the 1990 
settlement's inherent flaws. "[T]he October 4 [2002] 
action and subsequent developments have given validity 
to the Maoist theory that the 'people-based sovereignty' 
enshrined in the present constitution is just an illusion, 
and that the ultimate power remains with the King as 
long as the army is under his effective control", observes 
senior Congress leader Ram Sharan Mahat. "[T]he 
insurgency and regression have re-enforced each other 
for different reasons".247 
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VI. THE OPTIONS FOR POLITICAL 
TRANSITION 
In approaching substantive constitutional questions, the 
initial challenge is to break the political deadlock. There 
are three main options: an all-party government, which 
would operate like a round-table conference; nationwide 
elections; and restoration of the 1999 parliament. The aim 
of any political transition along these lines would be to 
reopen democratic space, allowing parties to introduce 
policies and fashion a consensus negotiating strategy. 
These options follow the logic that moves towards peace 
require two distinct stages: first, resolving the power 
tussle in Kathmandu between the so-called "constitutional 
forces", and only then negotiating with the Maoists. There 
is also, however, a fourth option which may be termed the 
"Maoist roadmap": to recognise that the resolution of 
executive power distribution, discussion of constitutional 
change and negotiation of a lasting peace are interlinked 
issues that could be addressed within a single-stage 
process if the Maoists could be persuaded to participate. 
Finally, the palace may well have its own vision of future 
constitutional arrangements: indications of what these 
might be have been outlined in Section  III.C above. 
Until the royal coup there was one further possible 
vehicle for transition: the High-Level Peace Committee 
(HLPC), which was disbanded by the king following his 
seizure of power. The associated peace secretariat has 
now been handed responsibility for investigating the 
needs of internally displaced persons.248 The history of the 
HLPC offers important lessons for any future efforts at 
negotiation. Established by the Deuba government on 22 
September 2004, it was to be a permanent governmental 
structure to provide technical support and a political 
mechanism for facilitating talks with the Maoists. 
However, it did not fulfil initial civil society hopes for a 
non-partisan vehicle that could bridge party differences 
and negotiate effectively. The HLPC was compromised 
from birth by partisan bickering, while its bureaucratic 
structure and staffing failed to draw on conflict-resolution 
expertise outside the public sector, antagonised donors 
and diminished effectiveness. 
The government initially tried to make the HLPC an all-
party body but Congress refused to join, contending that 
"the HLPC is a technical body; peace is a political 
problem".249 Shorn of bipartisan support, it lacked the 
stability for successful, inevitably protracted, negotiations. 
An advisory and assistance sub-committee was tasked 
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with generating initiatives and maintaining momentum 
but it would have had to change under a new government. 
Thus, the HLPC replicated a critical flaw of the 
government's 2003 negotiation team, which was replaced 
after Prime Minister Chand resigned in June 2003.250 
The HLPC's weaknesses illustrate the futility of a 
government negotiating institution that lacks a political 
consensus among the democratic parties. Any move by 
the palace to negotiate under the current circumstances 
would replicate some significant structural flaws of the 
HLPC, including the absence of consensus and the use 
of institutional formalities in lieu of political will. 
A. AN ALL-PARTY GOVERNMENT 
WITHOUT A PARLIAMENT 
The UML, RPP, NSP, NWPP and Janamorcha have 
proposed variations on an all-party or roundtable 
government bringing together representatives of the 
parties with seats in the 1999 parliament.251 Formation of 
such a government, however, would require overcoming 
significant process-related problems. 
While such a government could be constituted in "shadow" 
fashion as a symbolic challenge to royal rule, it would 
only be effective if accepted by the king, whether willingly 
or under pressure. Creating an all-party government 
would also require a minimum consensus among the 
parties themselves -- something that was not possible 
before February 2005 -- and treating its formation as a 
prerequisite to peace talks would give each party a de 
facto veto on progress with the Maoists. 
Further, it is not clear that an all-party government could 
overcome the credibility gap from which the Deuba 
government suffered. The king's use of Article 127 has 
hampered the ability of any post-October 2002 
government to act. Rather than making decisions based 
on perceptions of the public good, ministers in the 
Chand, Thapa and Deuba administrations had to engage 
in a complex balancing of their party's interests, their 
coalition partners' positions, and their perception of the 
king's wishes. An all-party government would not in 
itself address the underlying problem of an assertive 
monarchy determined to retain a stranglehold on the 
political process and the possibility of peace. 
In practical terms, an all-party government might have no 
more tools to change policy than the Deuba government 
had. Without a more fundamental change in institutional 
arrangements, the king could still retain veto power over 
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policy and legislative changes, undermining prospects for 
the peace negotiations. Although an all-party government 
appears attractive because it involves no legal hurdles 
(unlike restoration of parliament) or security concerns 
(unlike elections), it would have little increased credibility 
or leverage to negotiate with the palace or the insurgency. 
B. A GOVERNMENT FORMED AFTER NEW 
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS 
The Deuba government was set the impossible task of 
holding general elections. While its failure was used 
by the king as an excuse to seize power, the new royal 
administration has not committed itself to parliamentary 
elections, preferring to raise the prospect of municipal 
polls. With a monarch implacably opposed to helping the 
political parties regain legitimacy and the Maoists insisting 
they will disrupt any attempt at elections, the prospects 
for a new parliament look poor. Elections are more likely 
to be deployed as a hollow rhetorical tool or, from the 
palace's perspective, seen as a means embedding a more 
Panchayat-style government. 
As noted, since the inception of their insurgency, the 
Maoists have targeted cadres of other parties. Deuba's 
dissolution of local governments further deprived many 
party workers of their most important grass-roots contact. 
The withdrawal of police from rural areas has forced 
many village politicians to retreat to district centres. The 
security situation cannot be improved overnight, even 
though the Maoists have since February 2005 encouraged 
the workers of other parties to resume working in the 
villages. As long as the threat of armed violence -- 
whether before, during or after polls -- remains credible, a 
free and fair election is hard to envisage. 
Furthermore, the Maoists are not the only threat to a 
democratic election. Voting in the current environment 
would be concentrated in urban areas -- especially if the 
call for municipal polls goes ahead -- and conducted 
under the close supervision of an army allied to the king. 
Mistrust of the army runs high among local politicians. 
Certain Congress activists contend that soldiers "know 
only the language of king and country and don't 
understand democracy". They would have to return 
to barracks before elections could be fair.252 Even before 
February 2005, peace activists report meeting soldiers 
posted in Jhapa who told them that politicians had failed, 
so the military would not hand back power.253 The 
situation has only worsened since the royal coup. 
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It is true that elections have been held in less-than-ideal 
security environments: Sri Lanka and Jammu and Kashmir 
are cited as examples.254 But recent elections in those 
areas show a high human cost in the context of a 
continuing insurgency. Elections in Sri Lanka have 
been marred by violence throughout the polling 
cycle.255 The 2004 parliamentary elections saw five 
murders, fifteen serious injuries and more than 2,000 
cases of violence.256 In 2002 in Jammu and Kashmir, 
more than 800 people were killed prior to balloting; in 
some areas, including Srinagar itself, turnout was as low 
as 11 per cent. That election's surprising result -- the 
defeat of incumbents -- was "no panacea", but did mark 
"an important step forward".257 But in Nepal, where three 
relatively free and fair elections have been held since 
1991, a new round would not have any dramatically 
new demonstrative effect. 
Even if polls were phased and security measures taken, 
the Maoists would have no shortage of opportunities to 
disrupt the process. Elections generate soft targets ideal 
for their low-intensity, asymmetrical warfare: campaign 
workers, voters, candidates, administrative staff, 
monitors, elected officials and their families are all 
vulnerable before and after. Nepal's geography, which 
impedes the RNA's counter-insurgency efforts, would 
hinder efforts to ensure safety of candidates and voters. 
Maoist capacity to attack targets before, during or after 
an election would make regional phasing a less than 
effective security device.258 If an election were held in 
phases, with the RNA moving from one district to 
another, the army would lack means to consolidate 
temporary improvements in security. Free and fair 
elections cannot be guaranteed simply by providing 
security at the moment of voting. Genuinely unhindered 
participation requires dramatic increase in faith in 
the state's ability to protect citizens against violence 
and intimidation. 
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C. A GOVERNMENT FORMED AFTER 
RESTORATION OF THE PARLIAMENT 
ELECTED IN 1999 
Parliamentary restoration is viewed as a partisan agenda 
and confronts significant legal and political obstacles. 
Nevertheless, it may represent the best of Nepal's poor 
options for breaking the impasse and offering a return to 
constitutional democracy. It is also the only option that has 
notably gained ground across a range of constituencies. 
Influential commentators without affiliations to Congress 
started to argue for restoration from late 2004,259 and it is 
an option that had also by then begun to gain ground 
among influential diplomats.260 Indications are that the 
proposed Common Minimum Program of the mainstream 
parties in response to the February 2005 royal coup may 
well endorse restoration as the preferred option for re-
establishing democratic institutions.261 This position has 
already been taken by a group of party representatives in 
New Delhi,262 although their views do not necessarily 
reflect the final consensus of party leaderships. More 
significant is the recent support statement of Nepali 
Congress (Democratic), a reversal of previously stubborn 
opposition.263 
A cabinet and prime minister selected by the 1999 
parliament would have a demonstrably democratic 
mandate and so be entitled to a more than nominal role 
in negotiations. The speaker of the dissolved House has 
observed that a parliament also could voice "the national 
consensus on peace", putting more pressure on the Maoists 
to come to the table than the RNA can by military 
means.264 Moreover, unlike an all-party government, a 
restored parliament would have power to legislate, and 
its bills arguably would have legal force even if not signed 
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by the king.265 By considering legislative measures to 
draw the RNA and the security services at least partially 
under civilian control, for example, it could begin to 
address Maoist concerns about control of the army.266 
Furthermore, the House of Representatives has a pivotal 
role in the functioning of constitutional bodies. The prime 
minister, the House's speaker and the leader of its 
opposition sit on the Constitutional Council, which is 
central to appointment of the Election Commissioner.267 
The National Human Rights Commission's appointment 
mechanism also assumes the legislature's existence and 
requires the participation of the prime minister and leader 
of the opposition.268 Through such appointments, the 
House has a critical responsibility for consolidating 
democratic principles and ensuring the independence of 
constitutional institutions. When the mandate of the 
National Human Rights Commission expired on 25 
May 2005, the royal government appointed new 
commissioners via a modified mechanism. Human rights 
experts have described this process as illegitimate and in 
contravention of the "Paris Principles" that guarantee 
autonomy, independence, impartiality, efficiency 
and professionalism.269 
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national human rights bodies must have to ensure their integrity 
and independence and can be found at http://www.unhchr.ch/ 
Towards a Lasting Peace in Nepal: The Constitutional Issues 
Crisis Group Asia Report N°99, 15 June 2005 Page 29 
 
 
 
Parliament's restoration would also present an opportunity 
to reconsider Prime Minister Deuba's May 2002 
dissolution of local elected bodies, the Village 
Development Committees (VDCs) and District 
Development Councils (DDCs). Described by one analyst 
as "a colossal blunder", the dissolution eliminated a power 
base for the rival UML but also deprived the people of their 
most immediate and accessible contact with democracy.270 
Under the 1999 law, local government was for the first 
time receiving limited funds for development projects.271 
Although it may have been too little, this was a significant 
break from the practice of development directed by line 
ministries in Kathmandu.272 Even if VDCs and DDCs 
cannot function in all locations, their renewal would give 
mainstream parties a vehicle to reassert their presence and 
democratic order at a local level. 
Parliamentary restoration also has significant drawbacks. 
The notion features most prominently in Congress' 
agenda, so it takes on a partisan hue and is resisted by 
Congress (D) and the king. The Maoists also oppose it as 
"the idea of reactionary forces to dupe the people".273 A 
restored parliament, moreover, could descend all too 
easily into the internecine, parochial bickering that has 
characterised previous sessions. From the start of the 
"people's war" in 1996 to 2002 dissolution, parliament 
failed to cope with the insurgency. Even if the royal coup 
has focused minds on a common agenda, the parties are 
still fractious. Reconvening parliament would not in itself 
make compromise easier nor deliver a coherent agenda. 
Such problems could be addressed by restoring parliament 
with a mandate limited in time and scope. For example, it 
might meet for three to six months with specifically 
defined tasks such as to fix an agenda for constitutional 
change and to negotiate, based on that agenda, with 
the Maoists. It also could decide how to change the 
constitution. The sole basis for extending its mandate 
would be to allow more time for negotiations.274 The aim 
of such talks would be a transitional arrangement -- for 
example, elections for a constitutional assembly -- that 
 
 
Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/A.RES.48.134.En?Open 
document. 
270 Gersony, op. cit., pp. 41-42. 
271 For details of VDC and DDC functioning, see 
"Decentralisation in Nepal: Prospects and Challenges. Findings 
and Recommendations of Joint HMGN-Donor Review", March 
2001, pp. 2-3. 
272 Crisis Group interview with NGO local governance expert, 
Lalitpur, 12 October 2004. 
273 CPN(M) spokesperson Krishna Bahadur Mahara, cited in 
"Conditional", Kantipur, 26 September 2004. 
274 A government negotiator in 2003 observed that party 
politicians had expected immediate results, and the pressure 
had complicated negotiations. Crisis Group interview with 
former government negotiator, Kathmandu, October 2004. 
would involve the Maoists and end the life of the 
parliament. These transitional measures would be more 
sustainable because they would have democratic 
legitimacy. The restored parliament would be an 
intermediate body: although it would operate under 
the 1990 Constitution, its restoration would imply no 
commitment to that legal regime. 
A parliament understood as transitional would be less 
likely to be perceived as a vehicle for Congress resurgence. 
A compromise on duration and purpose might strengthen 
the case for restoration within other parties. However, 
there does not appear to be a legal mechanism to limit a 
parliament's agenda. The constitution places no constraints 
on parliament except for banning discussion of certain 
issues,275 thus implying parliament otherwise has freedom 
of action. No other institution is vested with power 
to limit its term or debate. Nevertheless, there are two 
ways to achieve such a restricted parliament. First, an 
informal, but public, agreement between parties on a 
strictly delimited mandate could be part of the negotiations 
for restoration. This is the implication of the seven-party 
agreement, which states that restoration of parliament 
is a route to negotiations with the Maoists by an all-party 
government.276 Secondly, the Supreme Court has 
"extraordinary power to issue necessary and appropriate 
orders" to resolve any constitutional or legal questions.277 
Using that open-ended authority, it could reconstitute the 
House of Representatives with a limited mandate. A 
judgement setting forth the goals of restoration would be 
an institutional check on free-wheeling partisan debate 
since the Supreme Court could consider petitions if the 
parliament strayed beyond negotiations and political 
transformation.278 
Parliament can be restored either by the king, upon 
recommendation of the prime minister and cabinet, or 
the Supreme Court.279 As a practical matter, either route 
would probably require palace sanction, as the instinctively 
conservative judiciary would be unlikely to go against 
its wishes. The first option would have been feasible 
before February 2005 if Deuba's cabinet had been able 
to agree on submitting a recommendation. Even 
following the dismissal of that government, the king 
 
 
275 Most importantly, criticism of the king, queen and heir to 
the throne is barred. Article 56(1) of the 1990 Constitution.  
276 "Parties put support for House revival on paper", 
www.kantipuronline.com, 8 May 2005. 
277 Article 88(2), Constitution of the Kingdom of Nepal, 1990. 
278 The Court lacks strong sanctions if parliament strays but 
it could heighten the cost of exceeding the mandate. 
279 A less common opinion, held by at least one senior 
Congress official, is that the National Assembly (the upper 
house) has the power to restore the House of Representatives. 
Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, 7 October 2004. But it is 
difficult to see what legitimacy gain this would bring. 
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could still invoke Article 127 to restore parliament: there 
might be a debate over the legal niceties of such a 
move but it would possess more acceptability, both de 
jure and de facto, than his 1 February move. 
The second path runs through the Supreme Court, a full 
bench of which in 2002 endorsed dissolution of 
parliament.280 Pivotal to that judgement was a 1995 
precedent concerning Man Mohan Adhikari's attempt to 
dissolve the House, in which the Supreme Court had 
held that if a quarter of the members tabled a no-
confidence motion, the prime minister could not 
dissolve the House until that motion was addressed.281 In 
2002 the Supreme Court said little beyond noting the 
absence of such a no-confidence motion.282 
The constitution allows the Court to reconsider its own 
judgements; the Judicial Administration Act clarifies that 
this must be done by the same bench that initially heard 
the case.283 According to a lawyer involved in 2002, only 
two of the participating judges have retired and been 
replaced.284 A motion for reconsideration might be made 
by those who brought the original 2002 action or parties 
could file a public-interest case.285 The 1995 judgement 
demonstrates that the Court has authority to revoke a 
prime minister's dissolution decision. Moreover, sound 
 
 
280 Crisis Group interviews with Supreme Court advocate, 
Kathmandu, October 2004. 
281 Ibid. Ravi Raj Bhandari v. The Rt. Honourable Prime 
Minister Mr. Man Mohan Adhikari, reprinted in Ram Krishna 
Timalsena, ed., Some Landmark Decisions of the Supreme 
Court of Nepal (Kathmandu, 2003), p. 18. Article 59(2) of the 
1990 Constitution envisages no-confidence motions: "One-
fourth of the total members of the House of Representatives 
may table in writing a no-confidence motion against the Prime 
Minster"; that motion is subject to majority vote. Article 59(3) 
of the 1990 Constitution of Nepal. 
282 Crisis Group interviews with Supreme Court advocate, 
Kathmandu, October 2004. According to a commentator, 
Deuba brought the dissolution motion to King Gyanendra late 
one evening. Although King Birendra's practice had been to 
consult with legal experts on a dissolution request, Gyanendra 
authorised it that evening. Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, 
October 2004. 
283 "The Supreme Court may review its own judgement or 
final orders subject to the conditions and in the circumstances 
prescribed by law". Article 88(4) of the 1990 Constitution of 
Nepal. 
284 Crisis Group interview with Yubaraj Sangroula, Dean of 
Kathmandu School of Law, Kathmandu and counsel for Hari 
Nepal and Ganesh Pandit, 21 October 2004. 
285 Ibid. Professor Sangroula posited that Deuba's appearance 
before the Court arguing for reinstatement of the 1999 
parliament would have a powerful effect. It seems unlikely, 
however, that he could be persuaded to concede that changed 
conditions warrant reconsideration of his May 2002 decision. 
legal grounds exist for revising the 2002 judgement.286 
The constitution specifies that the king, upon dissolving 
the House, "shall…specify a date, to be within six 
months, for new elections…"287 In other words, "holding 
an election is a condition subsequent for dissolving the 
parliament".288 Absent the stipulated elections, the 
argument that the proper remedy is restoration of the 
1999 parliament gains strength. 
Again there would be a debate over technicalities, not 
least the question of whether the parliament's term 
expired irrevocably in 2004, five years after its 
election. But the challenge is primarily that of finding 
a politically acceptable way out. Any attempt to 
restore parliament through royal fiat or the Supreme 
Court would confront significant political obstacles. 
In practice, the Supreme Court route would almost 
certainly be dependent on royal approval. Initially, the 
Court was dominated by individuals with strong party 
loyalties, particularly to Congress. The main such voices 
having left the bench, most judges now are former 
bureaucrats "with no loyalty except to the establishment 
of the day", that is, the palace.289 Unsurprisingly, the 
bench has adopted "a soft touch" toward the military, 
declining to issue contempt citations on the detentions 
issue.290 In January 2005 it refused to register a petition 
for parliament's restoration291 and in May it similarly 
rejected an effort to convene a sitting of the House to 
consider royal orders issued under Article 127.292 The 
new Chief Justice, Hari Prasad Sharma, has gone out of 
 
 
286Crisis Group interviews with lawyers, Kathmandu, October 
2004. 
287 Article 53(4) of the 1990 Constitution of Nepal.  
288 Crisis Group interview, Nilamber Acharya, former Law 
Minister, Kathmandu, 28 September 2004. Former Chief 
Justice Biswanath Upadhyay made a similar observation. 
289 Crisis Group interviews with lawyers, Kathmandu, October 
2004. 
290 Crisis Group interview with law professor, Kathmandu, 
October 2004. The Court has censured officers for failing to 
respond in habeas corpus proceedings. Jogendra Ghimire, 
"Court Calls", The Nation, 4 July 2004, p. 11. In a meeting 
with the Chief Justice on 22 November 2004, Chief of Army 
Staff Pyar Jung Thapa promised that the RNA would respect 
court orders, "SC asks RNA to obey orders", nepalnews.com, 
26 November 2005. Nevertheless, an environment of legal 
impunity for the security forces remained in place. See Crisis 
Group Report, Dealing with a Human Rights Crisis, op. cit., 
24 March 2005 and Amnesty International, "Nepal: Killing 
with impunity", 20 January 2005, ASA 31/001/2005. 
291 Kantipur, 17 January 2005. 
292 "SC rejects writ asking House session", nepalnews.com, 
19 May 2005. 
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his way to support the royal coup and denigrate the 
democratic process.293  
The Attorney General argues that once the king assumes 
power through Article 127, no parliamentary restoration 
is possible.294 This bare assertion, however, runs contrary 
to Article 127's text, which requires parliamentary approval 
of royal measures taken under that provision of the 
constitution. Nor does the article express any preference 
between restoration and fresh elections in the unanticipated 
situation Nepal now finds itself in. Council of Ministers 
Vice Chairman Peter Giri has underlined the 
powerlessness of the courts by pressing the parties to take 
their demand for restoration to the Supreme Court 
while simultaneously noting that the parliament is 
"already dead".295 He had previously called the 
demand for restoration of democratic institutions itself 
"undemocratic".296 A judicial challenge to dissolution thus 
may require the same political pressures on parties and 
king as the overtly political route. 
The king has steadfastly opposed parliamentary restoration 
but it may yet offer the best hope for salvaging his own 
interests. His primary concern is survival of the monarchy, 
which requires a modicum of public support.297 The 
most significant blows to King Gyanendra's legitimacy 
have been self-inflicted. By late 2004 polls showed a 
two to one disapproval of his October 2002 dismissal 
of Deuba.298 The popularity of the February 2005 coup 
has not been put to the test but there are no concrete 
signs that nationwide opinion has altered significantly. 
By initially declining to rule directly, the king appeared 
to recognise that there is scant support for an absolute 
monarchy. But the February 2005 takeover has entirely 
 
 
293 Speech delivered on 20 March 2005 at the 11th Conference 
of the Chief Justices of Asia Pacific. 
294 "No constitutional basis for House reinstatement: AG", 
nepalnews.com, 11 May 2005. 
295 "Knock the door of court instead of protest: Giri", 
www.kantipuronline.com, 5 June 2005. 
296 "Giri lashes out at parties, marks 100 days since Feb 1", 
www.kantipuronline.com, 12 May 2005. 
297 Gyanendra's efforts to shore up legitimacy are particularly 
important in light of the inauspicious way he came to the throne, 
following Prince Dipendra's 1 June 2001 massacre of King 
Birendra and members of the royal family, and the unpopularity 
of his son, Paras, who has a reputation for violent and dissolute 
behaviour. Crisis Group interviews, Kathmandu, October 2004. 
Amy Waldman, "Kathmandu Asks: Is Gyanendra Smoking as 
Nepal Burns?", The New York Times, 25 April 2004. 
298 A nationwide survey and one limited to the Kathmandu 
Valley yielded similar results: about 50 per cent condemning the 
king's action, and about 25 per cent approving. Greenberg 
Quinlan Rosner Research Inc., op. cit., p. 5 (nationwide); Kunda 
Dixit, "Yes and No", Nepali Times, 15-21 October 2004, p. 5 
(Kathmandu Valley only). 
removed the notional separation between king and 
political power. 
Responsibility for addressing the insurgency, and for 
all other government policy, is now attributed directly 
to the king. Restoring parliament may be one way the 
king can separate himself from daily politics and 
recapture some of his lost legitimacy. For those who 
support the palace but also insist on the parties' continuing 
significance, parliamentary restoration would furnish 
an opportunity to encourage meaningful partnership 
between the two power centres. Given the heightened 
mutual suspicions since the February coup, this may 
well be the last chance to salvage a compromise 
which an increasing number of observers suspect may 
already no longer be viable. 
D. THE "MAOIST ROADMAP" 
The Maoists have long put forward their own roadmap 
for ending the conflict: a roundtable conference, followed 
by an interim government and an elected constitutional 
assembly.299 There are many reasons for questioning 
whether Maoist assurances that they would follow such a 
process were it to be initiated can be taken at face value. 
Nevertheless, the idea of accepting the modality of a 
constitutional assembly as a means of encouraging -- or 
even forcing -- Maoist participation has gained wide 
acceptance among non-Maoist parties and opinion-
formers, including some in the royalist RPP, since 
the failed 2003 talks. United Nations Assistant Secretary 
General Kul Chandra Gautam recently insisted that "ways 
can be found to accommodate the Maoist demand of 
a round-table conference, an interim government and 
some form of constituent assembly that is consistent with 
[democratic] principles".300 It should not, therefore, 
be dismissed out of hand. Nor should it be accepted 
uncritically. 
Even if the Maoists opt for negotiations, their writings 
provide grounds to doubt that they would accept any 
unfavourable outcome of a constitutional assembly. In 
particular, the Maoists' insistence that they favour 
democracy should be viewed with caution given the 
understanding of that term in the Marxist-Leninist and 
Maoist traditions.301 They have expressed scepticism 
 
 
299 Prachanda, op. cit., p. 14. Maoist political goals will be 
discussed in detail in a forthcoming Crisis Group report. 
300 Kul Chandra Gautam, "Mistakes, miscalculations & 
middle ground", www.blog.com.np, 4 April 2005. 
301 The Maoists' debt to Leninism further counsels caution 
regarding endorsement of a constitutional assembly. Previously 
scheduled elections to a Russian constituent assembly were held 
after the Bolsheviks seized power in November 1917. In terms 
strikingly similar to those of the Nepali Maoists, Lenin endorsed 
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about the validity of the adult franchise as long as 
institutions like the army, bureaucracy and judiciary 
exist.302 They eulogise the Paris Commune of 1871, which, 
according to Marx, achieved a government of "plain 
working men" by tearing down the foundations of the 
bourgeois state -- police, army, churches and courts.303 
Mao in turn defined new democratic constitutional 
government as "the joint dictatorship of several 
revolutionary classes over the traitors and reactionaries" 
and rejected "bourgeois democracy" as practised in Europe 
and the U.S.304 The Maoist Chairman, Prachanda, recently 
reminded an international audience that "there will be free 
competition among political parties, [provided they] 
oppose feudalism and imperialism and work for the 
service of the masses", a definition that could in practice 
be highly restrictive.305 Indeed, attacks on other parties' 
cadres, most recently Janamorcha's, suggest a commitment 
to multi-party democracy that is only contingent and 
instrumental.306 The softening of their line since February 
2005, to the extent that even the RPP is gradually restarting 
political activities in rural areas,307 may be only a tactical 
manoeuvre. 
The Maoists have explained that negotiations and military 
actions are complementary means of achieving the same 
end-goal of a people's republic.308 Recent documents 
relating to the CPN(M)'s third plenum, in August 2004, 
make no mention of a constitutional assembly or any 
political compromise. Rather, they depict an insurgency 
that has not suffered significant military setbacks, even 
after the 2001 deployment of the Royal Nepalese Army, 
 
 
the assembly as a "perfectly legitimate part of the program of 
revolutionary Social-Democracy", because it "represents the 
highest form of [bourgeois] democracy", "Theses on the 
Constituent Assembly", in V.I. Lenin, Resistance and the State 
(Sydney, 2001), p. 113. Once defeated in the elections, 
however, the Bolsheviks dissolved it. Lenin gave an extended 
explanation of why the elections could not be trusted. Ibid, pp. 
117-135. Mao's approach to alliances under "democratic" 
banners was similarly pragmatic. See Mao Zedong, "On the 
Chungking Negotiations", Beijing, 1967. 
302 Prachanda, op. cit., pp. 12, 26. 
303 Karl Marx, "The Civil War in France", in Robert C. Tucker 
(ed.), The Marx-Engels Reader, 2d. ed. (New York, 1978), pp. 
631-632, 636. 
304 Mao Tse-Tung, "New-Democratic Constitutional 
Government", Beijing, 1967, p. 3. 
305 "We are trying to crush feudal autocracy ", Interview 
with Prachanda, Time Asia, 25 April 2005, available at 
http://www.time.com/time/asia/2005/nepal/int_prachandar.html. 
306 Crisis Group interviews with Janamorcha activists, 
Baglung, 20 January 2005; Binod Tripathee, "Maoists attack 
PFN activists, The Kathmandu Post, 2 October 2004. 
307 Crisis Group interview with RPP leader, Kathmandu, 25 
April 2005. 
308 See "Interview with Comrade Prachanda", in Thapa, op. 
cit., pp. 215-216.  
and promise a "strategic offensive raising the process of 
revolutionary transformation to a new height".309 In its 
post-coup crackdown, the RNA has inflicted heavy 
casualties on the rebels, for example killing an estimated 
150 Maoists in a single battle at Khara, in mid-western 
Rukum district, on the night of 7-8 April 2005. Yet these 
casualties were suffered in the context of a Maoist attack. 
The Maoist capacity and appetite for offensive military 
action is apparently unabated. 
Any stated Maoist commitment to democratic politics 
can thus hardly be taken for granted. The Maoists have 
also insisted from the outset that the greatest sin of true 
revolutionaries is to abandon the struggle without 
achieving the ultimate goal.310 Nonetheless, renewed 
Maoist involvement in the political process is not 
impossible. There are precedents for moving from 
armed struggle to peaceful mass movement according to 
circumstances and without abandoning overall aims.311 
The Maoists did take part in the 1991 election. Other 
leftist politicians who once espoused violent change, 
like the leaders of a 1971 uprising in the eastern district 
of Jhapa, have found their way back to democratic 
politics.312 
According to those in contact with the party, it stresses 
willingness to accept "the people's mandate" as expressed 
through a constitutional assembly.313 Maoist leaders have 
 
 
309 CPN(M) Central Committee, "Press Statement", 31 August 
2004, available at http://www.cpnm.org. 
310 "We are firm that it is a crime against the proletariat and the 
general masses of the people to start an armed struggle without 
the firm conviction of carrying it out to the end. We shall never 
allow this struggle to become a mere instrument for introducing 
partial reforms in the condition of the people, or terminating in 
a simple compromise by exerting pressure on the reactionary 
classes", "Theoretical Premises for the Historic Initiation of the 
People's War", in Some Important Documents of Communist 
Party of Nepal (Maoist), (Janadisha Publishers, 2004). 
311 The mainstream of the Indian Naxalite movement, for 
example, has rejected the armed struggle for some three decades. 
The Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist), which views 
itself as the inheritor of Naxalite leader Charu Mazumdar's 
legacy, has long argued in favour of grassroots work to develop 
a mass political base rather than adopting "left-adventurist" 
tactics of taking up arms prematurely. Baburam Bhattarai's 
reference to Engels' critique of Bakuninist revolutionaries in 
nineteenth century Spain (fn. 319 below) might indicate potential 
parallels in the Nepal context. 
312 For a brief account of the Jhapa uprising, modelled on the 
Naxalite movement of neighbouring West Bengal, see 
Hoftun, Raeper, and Whelpton, op. cit., pp. 83-84. One of its 
leaders, Radha Krishna Mainali, has now completed his 
traverse of the political spectrum by becoming a minister in 
the post-February 2005 royal government. 
313 Crisis Group interviews, New Delhi, September, November 
2004. 
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insisted on the record that they would abide by the 
outcome of a freely elected constitutional assembly,314 
while repeatedly expressing a conviction that the electoral 
process would deliver the results they desire.315 Since the 
royal coup, Prachanda has explicitly reaffirmed this 
position, urging other parties to join in the struggle for a 
"multi-party people's democratic republic" in order to 
safeguard their own future.316 
More sceptical observers suspect the Maoists are at least 
as wary as other forces of putting their popularity to the 
test in a free and fair poll.317 But by the end of 2004, 
Prachanda was speaking a language that offered hope for 
some common ground with the parties. In two separate 
published interviews he emphasised the "completion of 
the bourgeois democratic revolution" while staying silent 
on the ultimate progression to communism.318 In April 
2005, Baburam Bhattarai similarly had recourse to Engels 
to explain "why a proletarian party needs to uphold the 
program of a bourgeois republic in a country like present-
day Nepal".319 
It is certainly possible to treat the Maoist demand for a 
constitutional assembly as a peace opportunity rather than 
a mere ploy. As in the case of human rights monitoring,320 
but with broader significance for a peaceful resolution of 
the conflict, this could be an effective way of calling the 
Maoists' bluff and challenging them to deliver on their 
promises. They would then also face the challenge of 
developing a more precise negotiating position on concrete 
constitutional change and using force of argument rather 
than force of arms to advance their goals. 
 
 
314 For example, Prachanda stated that "We are convinced that 
the result of elections to a constituent assembly would be on 
the side of full democracy, in other words republicanism. 
Nevertheless, we are committed to respecting the outcome of 
the constituent assembly whatever it is". Interview, Nepal 
Samacharpatra, 20 December 2004. 
315 Crisis Group interviews with Maoist sympathisers, Delhi, 
November and December 2004, March and April 2005. 
316 Prachanda, press statement, 12 April 2005. The term used 
in Nepali is bahudaliya loktantrik ganatantra. 
317 Crisis Group interviews with political activists and analysts, 
Kathmandu and Delhi, February to April 2005. 
318 "Hami agragami rajnaitik nikas dinasakne vartako pakshama 
chhaun", Janadesh 14(3), 7 December 2004; interview with 
Prachanda, Nepal Samacharpatra, 20 December 2004. 
319 Baburam Bhattarai, "Royal Regression and the Question 
of a Democratic Republic in Nepal", Economic and Political 
Weekly, 9 April 2005, available at http://www.epw.org.in. 
320 See Crisis Group Report, Dealing with a Human Rights 
Crisis, op. cit., pp. 12, 20-21. 
VII. HOW CAN THE CONSTITUTION 
BE CHANGED? 
All parties, the palace and the Maoists have 
acknowledged the need for constitutional reform. As 
the previous section has made clear, however, 
differences arise not only over the type of reform 
needed but also over how to accomplish it. Three 
major models have been put forward: amendment as 
prescribed in Article 116 of the 1990 Constitution; a 
referendum; and a constitutional assembly. 
Preferences are dictated largely by the degree of change 
a stakeholder wishes. Thus, the palace, Congress (D), 
and the RPP have in the past endorsed amendment 
through Article 116, which involves the tightest 
restrictions. Congress and UML have now committed 
themselves to the joint seven-party position of accepting 
a constitutional assembly but many within both parties 
have previously preferred amendment. The Maoists 
have stated firmly that a constitutional assembly is a 
non-negotiable bottom line. The choice of vehicles for 
constitutional change thus has implications for the 
substance of an amended or new constitution. 
Three critical considerations arise in the selection of 
methodology. First, the Maoists will not accept a 
process in which their signature demand cannot be 
considered. They must persuade their cadres to accept a 
negotiated settlement. Having never been militarily 
defeated and wielding local power, CPN(M) cadres are 
unlikely to agree to a process that does not appear to 
offer even the possibility of considering a republic. The 
Maoist demand for a constitutional assembly reflects a 
perception that it would be the sole forum in which 
republicanism could be considered.321 The leadership's 
ability to command continuing support of its political 
and military constituencies is critically important. 
Otherwise the government would be confronted with a 
fragmented, multi-front guerrilla war less amenable to a 
negotiated outcome. Recent tensions between Prachanda 
and Baburam Bhattarai do not appear to have fractured 
the movement but they underline the faultlines that exist 
within the leadership and the possibility of more serious 
rifts developing. Given Bhattarai's role as the leader of 
previous negotiating teams, his apparent demotion may 
affect Maoist capacity and enthusiasm for talks. 
 
 
321 Crisis Group interviews with former negotiators and political 
analysts, Kathmandu, October 2004. As explained below, 
this is not necessarily correct. The issue could be raised in 
an extraordinary constitutional amendment process. 
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Secondly, the king requires minimal "implementation 
guarantees",322 which are in tension with the democratic 
element of any process of constitutional change. 
Gyanendra prioritises preserving the monarchy as an 
institution and is unlikely to endorse a process seemingly 
destined to end it. His antipathy to a constitutional 
assembly model derives from this. Guarantee of a 
continuing role for the palace may be a condition for a 
constitutional assembly. This would be difficult to disclose 
publicly and might undermine the legitimacy of the 
process. In short, a process of constitutional change must 
balance substantive compromises acceptable to major 
players with transparency and legitimacy considerations. 
The degree to which the palace is willing to compromise 
will be critical in determining whether any genuine 
tripartite process can go ahead. 
Thirdly, the process of constitutional change would occur 
in the context of negotiations between the key political 
stakeholders. Twice abandoned already, talks would be 
delicate and time-consuming.323 Although the interaction 
between constitutional change and negotiation has many 
aspects, a critical one that would have to shape the major 
decision on modalities would be the risk of walk-out: a 
constitutional process likely to precipitate that by a 
major player should be avoided. 
A related question concerns issues too contentious to be 
decided by constitutional amendment in the near term, 
the role of monarchy being an obvious example. If a 
new text leaves open broad possibilities for amendment, 
there would be less pressure to achieve an ideal 
document immediately. The trade-off between the present 
democratic deficit and the need for future stability 
may thus be mitigated by the text of the constitution. 
A.  CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 
The 1990 Constitution (Article 116) provides that bills 
"to amend or repeal any Article of [the] Constitution, 
without prejudicing the spirit of [the] Constitution, may 
be introduced in either House of Parliament; Provided 
that this Article shall not be subject to amendment". The 
"spirit" of the constitution is assumed to reside in its 
preamble, which enshrines "Adult Franchise, the 
Parliamentary System of Government, Constitutional 
Monarchy and the System of Multi-Party Democracy", 
along with basic human rights and rule of law.324 The 
 
 
322 Crisis Group interview with Shiva Hari Dahal, National 
Peace Campaign, Kathmandu, 11 October 2004.  
323 For recommendations on negotiations in the context of 
constitutional change, see Nicholas Haysom, "Negotiating the 
Political Settlement in South Africa. Are There Lessons for 
Other Countries?", Track Two, vol. 11, no. 3, pp. 35-44.  
324 Preamble of 1990 Constitution of Nepal. 
interaction between preamble and Article 116 thus limits 
the legislature's power to amend the constitution with 
regard to the monarchy. 
Limits on parliamentary amendment power reflect the 
drafters' concern to distinguish between ordinary 
parliamentary authority and the extraordinary authority of 
a body like a constitutional assembly.325 In incorporating 
this into the constitution, they followed a principle 
articulated by the Indian Supreme Court, which in a 
1973 case held that amendments by the legislature could 
not alter the "basic structure" of the constitution.326 The 
Indian Supreme Court has been restrained in applying 
this doctrine but has twice subsequently used it to strike 
down constitutional amendments.327 
Nepal's Supreme Court would likely follow this rule. It 
has stated that Article 88, defining its jurisdiction, gives 
"extraordinary powers to examine the validity of each 
and every act carried out in exercise of powers under the 
Constitution".328 Although it has never faced the question, 
interpretation of Article 116's limits on constitutional 
amendment seems to fall squarely within this mandate.  
The combination of an unambiguous bar on 
reconsideration of the monarchy and the Supreme 
Court's ability to enforce that restriction, makes the 
Article 116 amendment route attractive for the palace 
and unacceptable for the Maoists. It would also require 
the CPN(M) to compete first in ordinary parliamentary 
elections, which it rejected in 1994 and 1999.329 The 
Maoists argue that failure to amend the constitution 
during eleven years of parliamentary rule shows an 
absence of political will among mainstream parties. 
To seek amendment now would be to prescribe "old 
medicine".330 
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The amendment process, however, should not be 
summarily disregarded. Article 116 does not prevent the 
legislature from increasing or decreasing the monarch's 
substantive powers, for example by eliminating his 
function as supreme commander of the RNA.331 Further, 
the seemingly conclusive restrictions on Article 116 
amendment might be circumvented in two ways that 
are at least worth considering as potential vehicles 
for compromise between the palace and the Maoists. 
First, the constitution could be interpreted to vest the 
legislature, but not the Supreme Court, with the power to 
decide what is, or is not, consistent with the preamble. 
Article 116 explains that only a bill that does not 
"prejudic[e] the spirit of the Preamble of this Constitution" 
can be passed. Read literally, this means that it is the 
parliament that must first ascertain the consistency of 
any amendment with the preamble. By implication, once 
it has decided that there is no conflict, that question may no 
longer be open to debate. The Norwegian Constitution 
has been interpreted to contain a similar directive only 
for the legislature's direction.332 The general notion 
that such legal interpretations may be consigned to the 
legislature for resolution is common to many constitutional 
systems. 
Secondly, parliament could ignore the restriction on 
amendment of Article 116 and replace that article with a 
provision allowing wider amendment authority. The 
existence of the U.S. Constitution is a model for arguably 
illegal -- but remarkably effective -- constitutional change. 
The convention of state representatives in Philadelphia 
in 1787 had the limited task of improving the Articles 
of Confederation, the existing document.333 It not only 
produced an entirely new document, but also declined 
to follow the ratification procedures in the Articles of 
Confederation, instead seeking approval of nine of 
thirteen states through special constitutional conventions.334 
The continuing legitimacy of the American document 
suggests that formalism in drafting procedures is not 
necessary, particularly when the regime being superseded 
is understood to fall short of popular needs. 
At best, this might be a last-ditch option, if all other 
avenues to change were obstructed. Nepali constitutional 
lawyers doubt it would be politically or legally 
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acceptable.335 Nevertheless, if the Maoists are willing to 
participate in elections for a legislative body with power 
to amend the constitution beyond that granted by Article 
116, amendment could prove a mode of constitutional 
change acceptable to all parties. 
B. REFERENDUM 
The possibility of a referendum has received comparatively 
scant attention, and there is little agreement on what 
question or questions it might include. It is, however, one 
of the options being considered by cross-party working 
groups developing a joint position on the royal coup and 
ways to end the insurgency.336 Congress has suggested 
a restored parliament could legislate a referendum on 
whether to hold a constitutional assembly. Use of a costly 
device like a referendum to decide on a further process 
issue, however, seems unwarranted.337 The Maoists might 
push for a referendum on monarchy versus republic. 
Indeed, one commentator, citing Australia's 1999 
referendum on its constitutional monarchy, has suggested 
a referendum with two questions: first, whether Nepal 
should be a monarchy or republic; secondly, what kind 
of monarchy (active or constitutional) or republic 
(democratic or communist).338 
A referendum on such a fundamental choice, however, 
would risk political breakdown and increased conflict. It 
would be an all-or-nothing calculation for Maoists and 
king, without institutional guarantees. Unwilling to risk 
losing entirely, both would likely use every means at 
their disposal, including violence, during the campaign. 
The losing side would have little incentive not to dispute 
or reject the result. A referendum process alone does not 
create mechanisms for building the inclusive governance 
framework, even transitionally, that is necessary for a 
stable peace. 
The hazards of an all-or-nothing enterprise are suggested 
by Angola's 1992 presidential elections.339 On 31 May 
1991, after more than fifteen years of civil war, the 
opposing Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola 
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(MPLA) and the Uniao Nacional para a Independencia 
Total de Angola (UNITA) signed the Bicasse Agreement. 
In addition to a ceasefire, cantonment, and formation of 
a joint army, it envisaged presidential and parliamentary 
elections. In September 1992, after a relatively peaceful 
campaign and with more than 90 per cent of registered 
voters participating, the MPLA's Eduardo dos Santos 
secured 49.57 per cent of the vote against Jonas Savimbi's 
40.07 per cent. The sudden closure of the transition with 
the MPLA's victory shifted power too suddenly, and 
UNITA returned to the battlefield. It is all too easy 
to imagine the Maoists acting similarly if faced with 
a referendum defeat.  
C. CONSTITUTIONAL ASSEMBLY 
Support for a constitutional assembly has grown rapidly, 
especially since the beginning of 2004. Within parties the 
idea has spread from the republican student fringes to the 
mainstream. Former Congress Finance Minister Ram 
Sharan Mahat, for example, has stated that "[t]he country 
must be prepared for a radical political solution including 
election for a constitutional assembly as demanded by the 
Maoists, if that can make them renounce violence and lay 
down arms".340 At an April 2005 conference in New 
Delhi on Nepal's constitutional crisis organised by 
the Indian Supreme Court Bar Association and Human 
Rights Law Network, representatives from most 
major Nepali parties took this position: "The clear and 
unanimous view of all the representatives of the political 
parties was the consensus was unambiguously in favour 
of [a] constituent assembly and for the need for support 
from the international community. The ways towards 
the formation of the constitutional assembly need to 
be explored".341 
Even more conservative political analysts are willing to 
entertain the idea. Nishchal Nath Pandey, for example, 
observes that "[t]he Maoist demands of an election to a 
Constituent Assembly could actually start afresh a whole 
new set of debates to address the political, economic, 
social and ethnic reinvigoration of the country". But he 
cautions that in the absence of a mature democratic 
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culture, it could "open a Pandora's box of self-
determination and separatism among various ethnic 
groups and tribes".342 Understanding of what exactly a 
constitutional assembly would entail also remains 
vague.343 The constitutional assembly route has now 
been endorsed by the seven-party alliance but only as 
one possible option and without detailed consideration 
of modalities.344 
If momentum for a constitutional assembly continues to 
grow, it may be difficult to oppose the idea. For the time 
being, however, the palace remains deeply suspicious 
and is employing crude methods to try to stifle debate. 
Former Supreme Court Justice Laxman Prasad Aryal, 
Nepal Bar Association President Shambhu Thapa 
and constitutional lawyer Bhimarjun Acharya were 
scheduled to address the New Delhi conference but were 
unceremoniously removed from their flight as it was 
about to leave Kathmandu.345 Lok Raj Baral, a professor 
of political science and former ambassador to India, was 
arrested in the wake of the 1 February royal coup and 
has similarly been prevented from travelling to academic 
seminars. He has observed that "those who had argued 
for a constituent assembly for ending the present crisis 
are hounded and punished. In our case, our opinion has 
been taken seriously as if it is going to pose a threat 
to the regime".346 But a constitutional assembly, like 
constitutional amendment, is a flexible mechanism that 
would allow parties to select the issues on the table and 
those beyond debate. As a result, it could form part of a 
negotiated solution to the conflict in which all parties' 
interests were respected. 
The promise of a constitutional assembly derives from 
Nepal's first days of democracy. On 18 February 1951, 
following the Ranas' fall and negotiations in Delhi, King 
Tribhuvan declared that the country would be governed 
in accordance with a democratic constitution formulated 
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by an elected constitutional assembly.347 What form that 
assembly would take was never articulated and the promise 
never fulfilled. On 1 February 1958 his son, Mahendra, 
proclaimed establishment of a commission, not an 
assembly, to prepare a draft constitution.348 The 
commission, appointed a month later, was advised by 
British constitutional expert Ivor Jennings, and the resulting 
constitution was promulgated a mere week before 
multi-party elections were held on 12 February 1959.349 
The idea of a constitutional assembly did not die. Members 
of the original Communist Party of Nepal who broke from 
the main body, like Mohan Bikram Singh and Nirmal 
Lama, persisted in underlining the importance of an 
assembly through which the sovereign will of the people 
could be exercised.350 Although subsequently repudiated 
by the CPN(M), Singh was instrumental in developing 
popular support for communist ideas in Thawang, a 
village in northeast Rolpa that has come to be seen as the 
Maoist "capital".351 
That a constitutional assembly's appeal had not abated 
became apparent during the 1990 people's movement. In 
early 1990, parties in the United Left Front (ULF) and 
radical left parties in the United National People's 
Movement (UNPM) demanded a constitution prepared 
by a popularly elected assembly. Although the ULF 
retreated because of lack of support from its Congress 
ally, the UNPM, which included many of today's CPN(M), 
continued to press the demand, raising also the possibility 
that an elected parliament would approve the final 
constitution.352 However, a nine-member committee of 
lawyers prepared the 1990 Constitution, and King Birendra 
promulgated it.353  
A constitutional assembly has been part of the Maoist 
agenda since well before 1996 and has become 
increasingly popular among student wings of mainstream 
parties and some mainstream politicians. Neither the 
Maoists nor the others detail how it would function. The 
Maoists have stated it would be elected and would embody 
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"the sovereign rights of the Nepali people".354 But Maoist 
publications give no hint as to what they expect from a 
constitutional assembly. "The Maoists have merely said 
that the new constitution must be written by the people", 
noted a human rights activist who maintains contacts 
with the CPN(M).355  
Mainstream political parties offer no more clarity. 
According to a lawyer who has participated in debates 
within Congress, there is little understanding of how a 
constitutional assembly would work.356 Congress and 
UML politicians with whom Crisis Group spoke also 
were unable to explain. A September 2004 poll in the 
Kathmandu Valley found, unsurprisingly, that more 
than 60 per cent of respondents did not understand 
what a constitutional assembly would entail.357 
A larger survey of Nepali public opinion carried out in 
November and December 2004 attempted to gauge popular 
understandings of the concept with more revealing 
results:358 49 per cent of respondents had heard of a 
constitutional assembly, of whom 59 per cent claimed to 
have some or very good knowledge of the notion.359 While 
the pollsters claimed that only half of these correctly 
identified the true function of a constitutional assembly, 
their definition of "correct" and "incorrect" answers was 
too narrow.360 Given the sample population, of whom 21 
per cent were illiterate and a further 17.3 per cent had no 
formal education, the level of understanding was perhaps 
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not so unimpressive.361 Nevertheless, this poll, too, 
underlined the definitional confusion in the debate. Its 
findings reflected the fact that proponents will have to 
work harder to develop detailed policies and communicate 
them to the electorate. Furthermore, the survey found 
that only 16.7 per cent of respondents felt the need for a 
new constitution while 34.7 agreed with the statement 
that "amendment to the present constitution is required". 
The 41.5 per cent who did not know or could not say 
may well be open to persuasion. 
Ambiguity in the definition of a constitutional assembly 
may encourage dangerous misconceptions. Many whom 
Crisis Group interviewed, particularly from ethnic and 
lower caste groups, expressed hope that a constitutional 
assembly could represent their long-suppressed interests.362 
As an elected body, however, it likely would be dominated 
by the same political parties that controlled parliament 
between 1991 and 2002, even if the first-past-the-post 
election system was not used. Even with augmented 
representation, previously disadvantaged groups would 
have to bargain and compromise to achieve results with 
no guarantee their interests would be reflected in an end 
product. "There is a misconception of the constitutional 
assembly as a substantive outcome", explained a former 
law minister, and many have a flawed understanding 
of the difficulties of process and representation that 
it entails.363 
Despite the efforts of some political scientists and more 
diligent political activists, comparative cases are often 
cited uncritically. When pressed, civil society activists 
and student leaders point to the South African assembly 
that met between 1994 and 1996.364 Others point to the 
Indian experience.365 Examination of those models, 
however, suggests that their translation to the Nepali 
context would not be straightforward. 
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1. The South African constitutional process 
The formal constitution-making process in South Africa 
began in 1990. Critical talks between an imprisoned 
Nelson Mandela of the African National Congress (ANC) 
and the National Party (NP), however, started in 1985, 
gradually building a shared belief that negotiations were 
the solution to the conflict.366 Such a pre-negotiation 
appears to have no parallel in Nepal. Even after these 
pre-negotiations, the formal process was divided into 
an initial phase of "talks-about-talks", a second phase 
involving a constitutional assembly, and a final review 
by the South African Constitutional Court. The multiple 
stages reflect the importance of slowly building common 
ground between key players on fundamental issues 
of process and substance.  
"Talks about talks" began in May 1990, and the first formal 
negotiations -- the Convention for a Democratic South 
Africa ("Codesa") convened in December 1991. In May 
1992, the second session of Codesa broke down over 
federalism and the composition and role of the senate. 
Facing escalating political violence, the ANC and NP 
resumed talks in April 1993, and an interim constitution 
was adopted by "sufficient consensus" on 18 November.367 
Besides a transitional government of national unity, it set 
forth 34 principles for a final constitution and a framework 
for that document's adoption. Hence, the democratically-
elected constitutional assembly had a mandate limited 
by negotiated political settlement. This reflected a 
compromise between the minority NP's need to 
safeguard its position and the ANC's desire for a 
constitution based on democratic principles. Despite 
this compromise, the final constitution has not lacked 
legitimacy or support. The South African example thus 
demonstrates that a constitution-making process need 
not be impeccable in its democratic pedigree to obtain 
popular support. 
On 27 April 1994, a 490-member assembly was elected 
for a two-year term under a proportional representation 
system and tasked with both drafting a new constitution 
and acting as a legislature. A 46-member Constitutional 
Committee coordinated the former. The interim 
constitution required that the finished product be 
certified by the Constitutional Court for compliance with 
the 34 principles. On 6 September 1996, that tribunal 
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concluded that the finished draft fell short in nine 
respects.368 Rapid amendment and resubmission led to 
the Court approving a new draft in late 1996, which came 
into force in February 1997. 
The South African experience shows that a constitutional 
assembly is hardly a short-cut to political change. Rather, 
a constitution-making process is a vehicle for the long, 
hard road towards achieving such change. The balance of 
interests that was developed is a long way off in Nepal. 
Without a similar process of laborious behind-the-scenes 
and formal negotiations, it may be difficult for the 
political parties, the palace and the Maoists to agree on a 
set of shared principles. Moreover, experience suggests 
such an agreement could not be made public, due to 
pressures from hard-liners on both sides. 
2. The Indian constituent assembly 
Proposed by the Indian National Congress in 1934, an 
assembly to frame a new constitution was accepted by 
the British government in September 1945.369 It had 
members elected by provincial assemblies (one seat per 
million of population), with Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs 
chosen separately in each province, and 93 princely state 
representatives. The assembly was dominated by the 
Congress party, which swept the 1945 provincial 
elections with a 69 per cent majority.370  
However, Congress was "socially and ideologically 
diverse"; minorities like Christians and Parsis had a voice. 
More than 300 of its members participated in the 
constituent assembly (legislative), which acted as a 
parliament under the 1935 Government of India Act. 
Although the assembly's committees included Congress 
party chiefs like Jawaharlal Nehru, Maulana Azad, 
Rajendra Prasad, and Vallabhai Patel, there were also 
notable opponents of Congress, like Bhim Rao Ambedkar 
and Saiyed Mohammed Saadulla. Minorities filled 
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important positions: the dalit rights campaigner Ambedkar, 
for instance, headed the drafting committee.371 
The Indian experience highlights the importance of 
strong, nationally-minded leadership and a process that 
gives space to minorities. Institutional design must take 
into account that Nepal cannot assume a constitutional 
assembly would throw up leaders of the calibre of Nehru 
and Ambedkar. Further, although the Indian case shows 
that minority interests can be drawn into constitution-
making without formal mechanisms, Nepal's political 
party history of division and rancour and the absence of 
a broad-tent grouping like the Indian Congress party 
suggest such mechanisms would be needed for minority 
representation. 
3. Implementing a constitutional assembly 
Although the Indian and South African cases offer some 
important insights, innumerable practical questions would 
arise in designing a constitutional assembly. Three that 
initially would need answers are: (i) how to secure the 
palace's involvement; (ii) what electoral mechanism should 
be used and how minorities could be represented; and 
(iii) how the assembly would function. 
The threshold consideration for advocates of a 
constitutional assembly is how to use implementation 
guarantees to obtain the king's cooperation. Some 
evidence suggests that Gyanendra is not entirely hostile 
to a constitutional assembly. One of his confidants 
explained that the critical issue would be the body's 
purpose. If it was to advance a republic, the king would 
oppose it "totally"; if it was committed to constitutional 
monarchy and multi-party democracy and focused on 
considering other constitutional issues, he could accept 
it.372 Of course such statements have not been tested and 
must be judged in light of the palace's other actions. 
Those involved in the 2003 negotiations hint that they 
explored such a compromise but were unable to 
conclude it. According to former negotiators, the 
possibility of a tacit understanding on a constitutional 
monarchy between the palace and the Maoists was 
raised that would have secured the palace's consent for a 
constitutional assembly, even without pre-negotiated 
principles as in South Africa.373 By contrast, a formal 
arrangement on these lines could not work, as the 
Maoists would have difficulty persuading their cadres to 
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accept a constitutional monarchy. The post-February 
2005 environment makes it all the more unlikely that 
even an informal agreement on protecting the monarchy 
could be reached. 
A second question to be answered before a constitutional 
assembly could be convened concerns the system to 
select delegates. One point of consensus is that the body 
would be elected. But this consensus does not extend to 
the kind of elections. Nepal's first-past-the-post system, 
used for parliament, is seen by some as producing social 
exclusion.374 In the Tarai, NSP politicians contend that 
unfair apportionment dilutes the region's vote.375 If the 
electoral system is perceived to exclude sectors of the 
population, particularly those who already feel excluded 
from politics, the legitimacy of the body will suffer.376 
A debate on electoral reform, therefore, would have to 
precede a constitutional assembly, even if that assembly 
had to consider again what kind of electoral system to 
write into a new constitution. Prominent political scientist 
Krishna Khanal has proposed a more proportional model 
with multi-member districts.377 If a proportional model 
was difficult to establish and administer in the run-up to 
a constitutional assembly, seats could be set aside for 
certain social groups, like the ethnic communities and 
castes which have been traditionally excluded from 
government, and women.  
For example, in the Ugandan Constitutional Assembly 
of 1994-1995, 214 of 284 delegates were elected through 
universal adult franchise. The remaining 70 were selected 
by national bodies for discrete interest groups -- women, 
trade unions, the army, and youth.378 Negotiations over 
what group representation would supplement the directly 
elected seats could, of course, be problematic. Other 
devices exist for guaranteeing minority rights, including 
pre-negotiated principles as in South Africa, or a 
requirement that provisions concerning cultural and 
 
 
374 Crisis Group interviews with politicians, student leaders 
and dalit activists, Kathmandu, October 2004. 
375 Crisis Group interviews, Janakpur, 1 October 2004. 
376 One commentator has suggested returning to democracy's 
ancient Greek roots with a lottery system for a constitutional 
assembly election. See Shiva Gautam, "Contours of constituent 
assembly", The Kathmandu Post, 6 August 2004, p. 5.  
377 Crisis Group interview with Krishna Khanal, Tribhuvan 
University, Kirtipur, 7 October 2004; also Krishna P. Khanal, 
"Consideration on possible model of proportional representation 
for Nepal", unpublished paper in the possession of Crisis Group. 
378 John Waliggo, "The main actors in the constitution-making 
process in Uganda", in Goran Hyden and Denis Venter (eds.), 
Constitution-Making and Democratisation in Africa (Pretoria, 
2001), pp. 457-458.  
linguistic rights and devolution of power obtain the 
support of minorities for passage.379 
Finally, there are numerous questions pertaining to 
the practical mechanisms of an assembly: 
? Should a constitutional assembly also function 
as a legislature, as in India and in South Africa? 
Given the complexity of the constitutional issues, 
an assembly lasting several years, like South 
Africa's, might be necessary.380 
? What would be the agenda? Would the 1990 
Constitution be the departure point for analysis 
and discussion? A constitutional assembly does 
not necessitate radical change: an assembly might 
make relatively minor adjustments to the 1990 
Constitution.  
? Would all parties be represented on a technical 
drafting body? Government bureaucrats and 
lawyers tend to be conservative. In Afghanistan in 
2002 and Uganda in the early 1990s, drafts were 
prepared by a committee of experts and handed 
over to an elected assembly that debated them.381 
Would foreign experts play a role? 
? What public consultation would be undertaken? In 
Uganda, the committee conducted considerable 
public outreach and education. In Afghanistan, by 
contrast, this was limited and appeared to have 
little impact on the eventual product. 
? What would be the procedural mechanics, such as 
how the agenda would be set and decisions taken? 
Mechanisms should be designed to encourage 
consensus, avoiding the winner-takes-all 
atmosphere of a referendum. Some matters could 
be decided by a simple majority while others might 
require a super-majority, for example two-thirds. A 
division of subjects by sensitivity might be elaborated. 
Also, how would deadlocks be addressed?382 
 
 
379 A former politician observed that ethnic and caste groups 
would be better off securing a commitment to minority rights 
before a constitutional assembly, as broad consensus exists on 
those issues, at least superficially. Crisis Group interview with 
former Law Minister Nilamber Acharaya, 28 September 2004. 
380 Uganda's constitutional assembly inherited a draft from a 
prior commission but found four months "totally inadequate" 
to complete its task. James Wapakhabulo, "Managing the 
constitution-making process in Uganda", in Hyden and 
Venter, op. cit., p. 120.  
381 See Crisis Group Asia Report N°56, Afghanistan's Flawed 
Constitutional Process, 12 June 2003; Waliggo, op. cit., pp. 
45-56.  
382 South Africa, for example, maintained the threat of a 
referendum in case of deadlock, Gloppen, op. cit. p. 208. 
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A constitutional assembly would be tasked both with 
negotiating a solution acceptable to the sides in the 
present crisis and producing a stable governance 
framework for the long term. These goals may not be 
compatible in every respect. The selection of amendment 
mechanisms for a new constitution thus becomes an 
important element in considering how much must be 
decided immediately. The more open to amendment a 
new constitution is, the less the pressure to achieve a 
"perfect" document. 
In short, a decision to use a constitutional assembly to 
resolve the present troubles would be only the beginning. 
An assembly would need to be prefaced by considerable 
negotiation to ensure that all parties, particularly the 
palace, accepted the process. Such acceptance would 
more easily be secured through an informal, rather than 
a public, agreement. If that happened, the constitutional 
assembly route, despite raising many technical issues, 
might offer a promising exit strategy for Nepal's conflict. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
A comprehensive settlement of Nepal's conflict cannot be 
achieved by military means alone nor by cosmetic 
changes -- in whatever direction -- in the Kathmandu-
based government. Ultimately, sustained negotiations will 
have to allow a full range of representatives to deal with 
the major questions on the structure of the state and polity 
that the Maoist insurgency has brought into such sharp 
focus. This will inevitably involve revisiting the 1990 
Constitution and, most likely, amending or rewriting it. 
As this report has outlined, questions of both process 
and substance are significant and require further 
consideration. But a further political transition will 
be required in Kathmandu to reach a point at which 
meaningful and inclusive discussions on constitutional 
issues can take place. Given the apparent determination 
of the new royal government to continue its campaign 
against mainstream political parties, it is probable that 
such a transition will only happen under pressure. It is 
primarily for Nepal's political parties to exert such 
pressure but this is a challenge that will require both 
steadfastness and a willingness to reform themselves 
and win back public confidence. It is not for the 
international community to dictate options for 
constitutional change. Nevertheless, constructive 
engagement may speed the arrival of an environment 
conducive to substantive negotiations and a process of 
consensual reform. 
Any new government aiming for a resolution of the 
conflict must be willing to consider the most effective 
form of constitutional change. Both constitutional 
amendment and a constitutional assembly are far more 
flexible vehicles for legal change than they may at first 
appear. Whatever process is selected, the king will 
require guarantees -- formal or informal -- about how it 
is to be implemented if he is to participate. Any process 
also must be sensitive to the Maoist leadership's need to 
sell a negotiated settlement to its cadres. While initial 
negotiations to prepare the ground for substantive talks 
may have to be conducted discreetly, the primary 
condition for successful revision of the constitution will 
be the participation of the Nepali people. The durability 
of any new dispensation will depend on a legitimacy 
that can only be granted by a transparent demonstration 
of popular will. 
Kathmandu/Brussels, 15 June 2005 
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APPENDIX B 
 
KEY ARTICLES OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF NEPAL, 1990 
 
 
The following articles of the 1990 Constitution, provided here for ease of reference, are particularly relevant to the 
issues discussed in this report. Certain articles have not been presented in full.383 
1(1). This Constitution is the fundamental law of Nepal and all laws inconsistent with it shall, to the extent of such 
inconsistency, be void. 
2. Having common aspirations and united by a bond of allegiance to national independence and integrity of Nepal, 
the Nepalese people irrespective of religion, race, caste or tribe, collectively constitute the nation. 
3. The sovereignty of Nepal is vested in the Nepalese people and shall be exercised in accordance with the 
provisions of this Constitution. 
4(1). Nepal is a multiethnic, multilingual, democratic, independent, indivisible, sovereign, Hindu and Constitutional 
Monarchical Kingdom. 
6(1). The Nepali language in the Devanagari script is the language of the nation of Nepal. The Nepali language 
shall be the official language. 
6(2). All the languages spoken as the mother tongue in the various parts of Nepal are the national languages of Nepal. 
27(1). In this Constitution, the words "His Majesty" mean His Majesty the King for the time being reigning, being a 
descendant of the Great King Prithvi Narayan Shah and an adherent of Aryan Culture and the Hindu Religion. 
27(2). His Majesty is the symbol of the Nepalese nationality and the unity of the Nepalese people. 
27(3). His Majesty is to preserve and protect this Constitution by keeping in view the best interests and welfare of 
the people of Nepal. 
31. No question shall be raised in any court about any act performed by His Majesty: Provided that nothing in 
this Article shall be deemed to restrict any right under law to initiate proceedings against His Majesty's 
Government or any employee of His Majesty. 
56(1). No discussion shall be held in either House of Parliament on the conduct of His Majesty, Her Majesty the 
Queen and the heir apparent to His Majesty. 
88. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: 
(1) Any Nepali citizen may file a petition in the Supreme Court to have any law or any part thereof declared 
void on the ground of inconsistency with this Constitution because it imposes an unreasonable restriction on 
the enjoyment of the fundamental rights conferred by this Constitution or on any other ground, and 
extraordinary power shall rest with the Supreme Court to declare that law as void either ab initio or from the 
date of its decision if it appears that the law in question is inconsistent with the Constitution. 
(2) The Supreme Court shall, for the enforcement of the fundamental rights conferred by this Constitution, for 
the enforcement of any other legal right for which no other remedy has been provided or for which the remedy 
even though provided appears to be inadequate or ineffective, or for the settlement of any constitutional or legal 
question involved in any dispute of public interest or concern, have the extraordinary power to issue necessary 
and appropriate orders to enforce such rights or to settle the dispute. For these purposes the Supreme Court may, 
with a view to imparting full justice and providing the appropriate remedy, issue appropriate orders and writs 
including habeas corpus, mandamus, certiorari, prohibition and quo warranto: 
Provided that: 
 
 
383 The full text of the constitution, in English, is available at http://www.nepaldemocracy.org/documents/national_ laws/ 
constitution1990.htm. 
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(a) the Supreme Court shall not be deemed to have power under this clause to interfere with the proceedings 
and decisions of the Military Court except on the ground of absence of jurisdiction or on the ground that a 
proceeding has been initiated against, or punishment given to, a non-military person for an act other than an 
offence relating to the Army. 
(b) except on the ground of absence of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court shall not interfere under this clause 
with the proceedings and decisions of Parliament concerning penalties imposed by virtue of its Privileges. 
(3) The Supreme Court shall have original and appellate jurisdiction as defined by law. 
(4) The Supreme Court may review its own judgement or final orders subject to the conditions and in the 
circumstances prescribed by law. 
(5) If His Majesty wishes to have an opinion of the Supreme Court on any complicated legal question of 
interpretation of this Constitution or of any other law, the Court shall, upon consideration on the question, 
report to His Majesty its opinion thereon. 
112(2). Any law, arrangement or decision which allows for participation or involvement of only a single political 
organisation or party or persons having a single political ideology in the elections or in the political system of 
the country shall be inconsistent with this Constitution and shall be void. 
112(3). The Election Commission shall withhold recognition from any political organisation or any party formed 
either with the objectives mentioned in clause (2) above or on the basis of religion, community, caste, tribe or 
region. 
115. Emergency Power: 
(1) If a grave crisis arises in regard to the sovereignty or integrity of the Kingdom of Nepal or the security of 
any part thereof, whether by war, external aggression, armed rebellion or extreme economic disarray, His 
Majesty may, by Proclamation, declare or order a State of Emergency in respect of the whole of the Kingdom 
of Nepal or of any specified part thereof. 
(2) Every Proclamation or Order issued under clause (1) above shall be laid before a meeting of the House of 
Representatives for approval within three months from the date of issuance. 
(3) If a Proclamation or Order laid for approval pursuant to clause (2) is approved by a two-thirds majority of 
the House of Representatives present at that meeting, such Proclamation or Order shall continue in force for a 
period of six months from the date of issuance. 
(4) If a Proclamation or Order laid for approval pursuant to clause (2) is not approved pursuant to clause (3), 
such Proclamation or Order shall be deemed ipso facto to cease to operate. 
(5) Before the expiration of the period referred to in clause (3), if a meeting of the House of Representatives, 
by a majority of two thirds of the members present, passes a resolution to the effect that circumstances 
referred to in clause (1) above continue to exist, it may extend the period of the Proclamation or Order of the 
State of Emergency for one other period, not exceeding six months as specified in such resolution, and the 
Speaker shall inform His Majesty of such extension. 
(6) During a dissolution of the House of Representatives, the National Assembly shall exercise the powers of 
the House of Representatives for the purposes of clauses (2), (3), (4) and (5) above. 
(7) After the State of Emergency has been declared pursuant to clause (1), His Majesty may issue such Orders 
as are necessary to meet the exigencies. Orders so issued shall be operative with the same force and effect as 
law so long as the State of Emergency is in operation. 
(8) His Majesty may, at the time of making a Proclamation or Order of a State of Emergency pursuant to 
clause (1), suspend sub-clauses (a), (b), (d) and (e) of clause (2) of Article 12, clause (1) of Article 13 and 
Articles 15, 16, 17, 22 and 23 of this Constitution for as long as the Proclamation is in operation: 
Provided that the right to the remedy of habeas corpus under Article 23 shall not be suspended. 
(9) In circumstances where His Majesty has suspended any Article of this Constitution pursuant to clause (8), 
no petition may lie, nor question be raised in any court for the enforcement of the fundamental right conferred 
by such Article. 
(10) If, during the continuance of a Proclamation or Order under clause (1), any damage is inflicted upon any 
person by an act of any official which was done in contravention of law or in bad faith, the affected person may, 
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within three months from the date of termination of the Proclamation or Order, file a petition for compensation 
for the said damage and if the court finds the claim valid, it shall cause compensation to be delivered. 
(11) A Proclamation or Order of a State of Emergency issued pursuant to clause (1) may be revoked by His 
Majesty at any time during its continuance. 
116. Amendment of the Constitution: 
(1) A bill to amend or repeal any Article of this Constitution, without prejudicing the spirit of the Preamble of 
this Constitution, may be introduced in either House of Parliament: 
Provided that this Article shall not be subject to amendment. 
(2) If each House, with a two-thirds majority of its total membership attending, passes a Bill introduced pursuant 
to clause (1) by a majority of at least two thirds of the members present, the Bill shall be submitted to His 
Majesty for assent; and His Majesty may, within thirty days from the date of submission, either grant assent to 
such Bill or send the Bill back for reconsideration with His message to the House where the Bill originated. 
(3) A Bill sent back by His Majesty pursuant to clause (2) above shall be reconsidered by both Houses of 
Parliament; and if both the Houses, upon following the procedures referred to in clause (2), resubmit the Bill 
in its original an amended form to His Majesty for assent, His Majesty shall grant assent to such Bill within 
thirty days of such submission. 
117. Constitutional Council: 
(1) There shall be a Constitutional Council, for making recommendations in accordance with this Constitution 
for appointment of officials to Constitutional Bodies, which shall consist of the following as Chairman and 
members: (a) the Prime Minister Chairman; (b) the Chief Justice Member; (c) the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives Member; (d) the Chairman of the National Assembly Member; and (e) the Leader of the 
Opposition in the House of Representatives Member. 
118. Provisions Regarding the Royal Nepal Army: 
(1) There shall be a National Defence Council of Nepal consisting of the following as Chairman and members: (a) 
the Prime Minister Chairman; (b) the Defence Minister Member, and (c) the Commander-in-Chief Member. 
(2) His Majesty shall operate and use the Royal Nepal Army on the recommendation of the National Defence 
Council. 
(3) The establishment and management of the Royal Nepal Army, and other matters relating thereto, shall be 
as determined by law. 
(4) The National Defence Council shall have the power to regulate its working procedures on its own. 
119. Supreme Command of the Royal Nepal Army and Appointment of the Commander-in-Chief: 
(1) His Majesty is the Supreme Commander of the Royal Nepal Army. 
(2) His Majesty shall appoint the Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Nepal Army on the recommendation of 
the Prime Minister. 
127. Power to Remove Difficulties: 
If any difficulty arises in connection with the implementation of this Constitution, His Majesty may issue 
necessary Orders to remove such difficulty and such Orders shall be laid before Parliament. 
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a twelve-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct 
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situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world. 
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